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The long-term insurance industry is a heavily regulated industry, offering products that 
are often perceived to be complex in nature and not ideally suited for sale over the 
Internet.  This paper will consider the extent to which our law currently allows for the 
sale of long-term insurance products through the electronic medium and identify the 
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INTRODUCTION:  THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION AND e-COMMERCE 
 
During the previous half century the world experienced the development of technology 
that brought about a revolution in the way that information could be exchanged and 
stored.  By developing the technology that could transform information previously 
represented in analog format into a binary code, it became possible to communicate and 
store previously unthinkable quantities of data accurately and almost instantaneously.   
This phenomenon and the effect that it had on the world is generally referred to as the 
digital revolution. 
 
 Because of the tremendous impact that the ability to communicate and store these 
vast volumes of information has had on the way that people interact, especially with the 
advent of the Internet, the development has been likened to both the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions.1   In discussing the impact of the Internet on society, Prof Julien 
Hofman in his work entitled Cyberlaw – A guide for South Africans doing business online 
comments that “the information revolution brought about what was previously 
unimaginable: it conquers time and space as virtually any amount of information can 
now be sent almost anywhere in the world in the blink of an eye.”2
 
 The technology underlying this revolution consisted of a series of technological 
breakthroughs that can be traced back to as early as 1837 when Samuel Morse  
developed the telegraph which could convert physical movement into electronic impulses 
that could then be transmitted along a telegraph cable.  These electrical impulses were 
referred to as being “analog” because it could be represented as a series of sine waves, 
the modulation of which was “analogous” to fluctuations in the human voice or any other 
                                                
1 Hofman J, Cyberlaw, a guide for South Africans doing business online, Ampersand Press, 1999, 
Chapter 1 at page 12 
2 Ibid at page 13 
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sound being transmitted.3   An important development thereafter was the ability to 
convert an analog source into digital data.  The term “digital” which is Latin for “finger – 
counting on the fingers” refers to a system that uses binary numbers for the input, 
processing, transmission, storage, or display of data.  Information is converted into either 
one of two electronic or optical pulses, logic 1 (pulse present) or 0 (pulse absent).  In 
essence therefore, the digital revolution enabled signals (representing information) that 
was previously analog into a binary representation of ones and zeros.   
 
A further important breakthrough was the development of the micro processor 
which made widespread availability and use of the personal computer possible with its 
rapidly increasing performance capabilities.  Computer technology enabled various other 
mediums and devices such as cameras and music players to make use of this fantastic 
capability.  With digital cameras, optical and video images can be recorded and stored 
digitally and transferred to any destination on the planet with virtually no loss of clarity 
or resolution.  Similarly, audio recordings can by made and stored digitally allowing easy 
access to vast numbers of sound recordings, such as music collections. 
 
 Of particular importance was the development of the Internet and the worldwide 
web (the “WWW”).  The WWW is a network of digital data bases and communication 
links connecting virtually the entire developed world.  It opened, at a rapid pace, new 
avenues for communication and information sharing on a global scale.  This new ability 
to communicate had a profound effect on the way that people interact and it was not long 
before it started to change the way that they do business.  It soon became possible for 
providers of goods and services to market themselves and their products through this 
network and enter into transactions with clients in the same manner.  Businesses are 
increasingly doing business with other businesses through the electronic medium 
(“B2B”) and, with their clients (“B2C”). 
 
                                                
3 http://searchsmb.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid44_gci211561,00.html (accessed : 11/04/06) 
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Research conducted in 20044 indicated that there were 580 million Internet users 
worldwide.  It was forecast that this number would grow to 1.07 billion by 2005, 1.21 
billion by 2006 and 1.35 billion by 2007.  Revenues from B2C e-commerce worldwide 
were estimated to have grown from $59.7 billion in 2000 to $428.1 billion in 2004.5   In 
the USA, sales figures published by the US Census Bureau indicated that US retail e-
commerce sales during the third quarter of 2005 amounted to $20.8 billion6.  This figure 
represented a growth of 26.7% as compared to the third quarter of 2004.  Total retail sales 
increased only by 8.5% during the same period.   
 
The above clearly illustrates the increase in Internet connectivity worldwide and 
the resultant and growing use thereof by businesses and their customers for business 
purposes.  
 
In an article entitled “A Web Wake-Up Call”7  the author quotes a study 
conducted by Limra in 2004 which indicated that approximately 40% of consumers who 
shop for life assurance do not have any face-to-face contact with an insurance 
professional.  Limra is a worldwide association of insurance and financial services 
companies, established to help its members improve their marketing and distribution 
networks.  It showed that the computer is increasingly the medium of choice for 
sophisticated buyers and although such buyers may not necessarily buy insurance online, 
the Internet can help shorten the decision-making process and increase buyers’ product 
knowledge.  The author concludes that “traditional marketing methods such as mail, 
direct sales, telemarketing and broadcast media still work and should not be discounted” 
and that “consumer behaviour is changing, and consumers will be looking at , and 
purchasing from companies that have the information and products they want – when 
they want it”.   
 
                                                
4 www.e-consultancy.com/publications/internet-stats-compendium (accessed : 10/04/06) 
5 www.emarketer.com; http://retailindustry.about.com/library/bl/bl_em0320.htm (accessed : 
10/04/06) 
6 http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/ecomm.html (accessed : 10/04/06) 
7 Brett J, A Web Wake-Up Call, Limra’s Market Facts Quarterly / Fall 2005  
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Because of the tremendous pace at which the digital revolution occurred and is 
still occurring as technology develops, the law  did not always keep pace  with the new 
ways of communicating and transacting .  Prof Hofman8 comments on this state of affairs 
by pointing out that the rule of law ideally develops in an incremental and organic 
manner as it is essentially based on an orderly development of legal principles.  “Given 
such a conservative predisposition”, he states, “the law is badly placed to deal with 
revolution.  Revolution and the law are at opposite poles”.   
 
 This paper will endeavour to consider the extent to which our legal system 
currently makes it possible for transactions to be concluded electronically within the 




















                                                






CURRENT e-COMMERCE TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE  SOUTH 
AFRICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
 
e-Commerce in the South African financial services industry is currently dominated by 
online banking services.  Such services typically include:- 
 
(a) Balance enquiries; 
(b) Account payments; 
(c) Fund transfers; 
(d) Inter-account transfers 
(e) Checking interest rates 
(f) Information requests  
(g) Stop Orders 
(h) Cheque book ordering 
(i) Credit Card applications/ordering 
(j) Mortgage bond applications 
(k) Financial calculators 
(l) Personal loan applications 
(m) Car finance applications 
(n) Home loan applications 
(o) Purchasing foreign exchange. 
 
Other e-finance services include online share trading, online unit trust purchasing and 
online insurance purchasing.  Research conducted by BMI-TK Group, 2002 indicated an 
overall growth of the e-financial services market of 35% between 2000 and 2001.  It 
forecasted an average growth of 20% between 2001 and 2006.  A total amount of R798m 
in transaction fees were generated from electronic banking in 2001. This was estimated to 
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grow to R1.9b by 2006.  Total online financial services Internet usage was expected to 
increase in value terms from R730 000.00 in 2000 and R123.6m by 2006.   
 
 
The Long-term Insurance industry 
 
Long-term insurance, as opposed to short-term insurance, refers to “the business of 
providing …… policy benefits under long-term policies”9.  A long-term policy is defined 
in the Long-term Insurance Act, 52 of 1998 (“the LTIA”)  as “an assistance policy, a 
disability policy, fund policy, health policy, life policy or sinking fund policy, or a 
contract comprising a combination of any of those policies”.   
 
To be able to market and sell such policies, an assurer must be registered as a long-
term assurer in terms of the LTIA.  There are currently 77 companies registered as long-
term assurers in South Africa10.  Most long-term assurers offer policies to customers 
generally providing for the following benefits:- 
 
• Life insurance (term or whole life); 
• Disability insurance (occupational disability); 
• Health benefits (pays benefits upon the occurrence of a “health event” or illness). 
 
Normally, the policies also provide for the long-term saving of funds, and are 
therefore ideal vehicles to save for retirement.  The long-term assurers enjoy a virtual 
monopoly of the pension funds saving industry, by virtue of the fact that life and 
disability benefits can be offered to a client whilst such client is also saving for 
retirement.  Most life assurers therefore established pension funds for this purpose, whilst 
their asset management divisions are tasked to invest the combined savings of 
policyholders with the view to ensuring the best possible returns for policyholders upon 
disability or retirement.  Apart from contributing towards pension funds, policyholders 
                                                
9 The Long-term Insurance Act, 52 of 1998 
10 www.fsb.co.za (accessed on 10/04/06) 
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also invest in normal savings funds and investments, i.e. as long as the savings vehicle is 
underwritten or “wrapped” in a long-term policy.  A typical long-term assurer will 
therefore offer products that are designed to cater for the abovementioned needs. 
Examples of such products are the following:- 
 
• Life insurance policies; 
• Disability insurance policies; 
• Pension fund policies; 
• Endowment (investment) policies; 
• Employment benefits policies. 
 
Many assurers will also offer medical aid scheme benefits, but such benefits are 
regulated by the Medical Schemes Act and not in terms of the LTIA.  It therefore falls 
outside of the ambit of the long-term insurance business for purposes of this paper. 
 
Other important facets of the industry comprise: 
 
- Marketing (the offering of products and services and providing information); 
- Rendering Advice (relating to the products and services available); 
- Underwriting; 
- Contracting, including amendments/endorsements during the continuation of a 
policy or product; 
- Claims processing. 
 
 The policies referred to above are marketed and sold to individual policyholders, 
but policies offering employee benefits are made available to corporate entities or small 
and medium to large employers who can negotiate with long-term assurers for the 
provision of life, disability and pension benefits to their employees as a group.  In such a 
case a single policy agreement with a long-term assurer can for example provide life and 
disability benefits to all employees of the entity.  Policy benefits are thereby made 
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Most long-term assurers rely heavily, if not entirely, on intermediaries as the preferred 
distribution channel for the sale of its products.  Such intermediaries can be employees of 
the assurer i.e. “tied agents” or independent brokers, who function independently of any 
single life assurer and who can therefore decide which life assurer’s product to procure 
for their clients.  The “tied agent” would normally only sell the products of his or her 
employer.  In both cases, the intermediaries are remunerated on a commission basis 
although the “tied agent” will generally also receive a basic retainer.  In the case of 
independent brokers, each long-term assurer would enter into agreements with as many 
brokers as possible whereby such broker would be offered commission on policies 
purchased from the assurer for each of the broker’s clients. 
 
Most long-term assurers also offer its products for sale directly to the consumer 
through Direct Marketing initiatives.  As stated, this paper will consider the extent to 
which long-term insurance policies can be purchased through the Internet.  It follows that 
such transactions will not involve an intermediary and will most likely be offered through  
direct marketing divisions or e-Commerce business units.  It will be shown below that the 
regulatory requirements differ in certain important respects, depending on whether 
policies are sold via intermediaries or directly, as in the case of an online transaction.   
 
 
Industry Regulation - The Long-term Insurance Act 
 
The life insurance industry is generally regarded as a heavily regulated industry.  
Reference has already been made to the fact that life assurers must be registered in terms 
of the LTIA.  The LTIA contains various provisions that apply to the business practices 
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and product offerings of long-term assurers.  Chapter VII of the LTIA for instance, 
contains provisions applicable to business practices, policies and policyholder protection.  
The so-called “Policyholder Protection Rules”11 were published by the Minister of 
Finance in terms of s. 62 of  LTIA and contain provisions applicable to the marketing and 
sale of long-term insurance policies. 
 
PART VII of the Act deals with business practices and “policyholder protection” 
to which long-term assurers must adhere when selling these products. S. 44 of the Act, 
requires a policyholder to be provided with a “free choice in certain circumstances”. This 
requires the “policyholder to be given written notification of free choice” where a policy 
is taken out or ceded in terms of an agreement of loan or where credit is granted.  In 
terms of sub-section (2) the said requirement “shall be deemed not to have been complied 
with” if the policyholder has not “confirmed in writing” that he or she:  
 
“(a) was given prior written notification of his or her entitlement to the 
freedom of choice referred to in that subsection; 
  (b) exercised that freedom of choice; and 
  (c)  was not subject to any coercion or inducement as to the manner in 
which he or she exercised that freedom of choice.” 
 
In terms of s. 48 of the Act a person who enters into a long-term policy must, as 
soon as possible, but not later than 60 days after the transaction, be provided with a 
written summary of: 
 
“(a) those of the representations made by or on behalf of that person to the 
assurer which were regarded by that assurer as material to its 
assessment of the risks under the policy; 
(b) the premiums payable and the policy benefits to be provided under the 
policy; and 
(c) the events in respect of which the policy benefits are to be provided 
and the circumstances (if any) in which those benefits are not to be 
provided.” 
 
                                                




Such summary may be provided to the client in electronic form, as stated in s. 12 
of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 25 of 2002 (the “ECT Act”)12. 
 
The Policyholder Protection Rules were formulated with the objective “to ensure 
that policies…are entered into, executed and enforced in accordance with sound 
insurance principles and practice in the interests of the parties and in the public 
interest”.  It contains provisions that apply specifically to “direct marketers”.  It is 
interesting to note, at this stage, that the Rules define “direct marketing” as “the 
marketing of a policy by way of telephone, Internet, media insert, direct or electronic 
mail in a manner which includes the required transaction requirement pertaining 
thereto…” and a “direct marketer” as “an assurer who, in the normal course of business, 
carries on business in the form of direct marketing”.  The legislator clearly envisaged in 
the drafting and promulgation of  the Rules, the selling of long-term insurance policies 
through the electronic medium and careful consideration must therefore be given to the 
provisions in this regard.  It will be shown in the discussion of the FAIS Act below, that 
similar mention is made to “direct marketing”.   
 
Part III of the Rules that deal with the requirements applicable to direct 
marketers states in Rule 4.4 thereof that “a provision of a Rule in this Part is not 
applicable to a direct marketer in any case where a compliance duty in respect of the 
same matter is imposed on the direct marketer by, in terms of or by virtue of any other 
law”.  Any long-term assurer who offers long-term insurance policies for sale through the 
electronic medium, will therefore have to ensure that it is compliant not only with the 
provisions of the FAIS Act13 discussed below, but also with any provisions contained in 
these Rules that is perhaps not contained in the FAIS Act. 
 
                                                
12 Sec. 12 of the ECT Act states that a requirement in law that a document or information must be 
in writing is met if the document or information is (a) in the form of a data message and (b) 
accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference. 
13 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No 37 of 2002 
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Part V of the Rules contains provisions applicable to cancellations of policies 
and cooling off periods.  In terms of Rule 6.1 a policyholder may “in any case where no 
benefit has yet been paid or claimed or an event insured against has not yet occurred” 
cancel the policy taken out, provided that it is done within 30 days of receipt of the 
summary issued in terms of s 48, referred to above.   
 
  
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
 
A further and very important Act that regulates the selling of long-term insurance policies 
and the rendering of financial advice is the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act, No. 37 of 2002 (“FAIS”).   This Act was promulgated to “regulate the rendering of 
certain financial advisory and intermediary services” and came into effect on 31 October 
2004.  It applies to all providers of financial services, which by definition includes long-
term assurers.  It contains detailed provisions relating inter alia to:- 
 
(a) The licensing of all financial services providers (s 7); 
(b) The qualifications and training of representatives of financial services 
providers (ss 13-14); 
(c) The responsibility of financial services providers to ensure compliance with 
the Act (s 17); 
(d) Record keeping (s 18); 
(e) Interaction with clients and compulsory disclosures as well as the rendering of 
advice (ss 3 and 6 of the General Code, ito s 15 of the Act). 
 
It is important for purposes of this paper, to carefully consider the definition of 
certain terms contained in the Act as it has an important bearing on the selling of long-
term insurance policies through the electronic medium.  In terms of the Act a “financial 
services provider” or “FSP” means “any person…who as a regular feature of the 
business of such person- 
(a) furnishes advice; or 
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(b) furnishes advice and renders any intermediary service; or 
(c) renders an intermediary service”. 
 
“Advice” is defined in the Act as: 
“any recommendation, guidance or proposal of a financial nature furnished, by any 
means or medium, to any client or group of clients— 
(a) in respect of the purchase of any financial product; or 
(b) in respect of the investment in any financial product; or 
(c) on the conclusion of any other transaction, including a loan or cession, aimed at 
the incurring of any liability or the acquisition of any right or benefit in respect of 
any financial product; or 
(d) on the variation of any term or condition applying to a financial product, on the 
replacement of any such product, or on the termination of any purchase of or 
investment in any such product, 
and irrespective of whether or not such advice— 
(i) is furnished in the course of or incidental to financial planning in 
connection with the affairs of the client; or 
(ii) results in any such purchase, investment, transaction, variation, 
replacement or termination, as the case may be, being effected.” 
 
A similarly wide definition applies to “intermediary service” which is defined as: 
“any act other than the furnishing of advice, performed by a person for or on behalf of 
a client or product supplier— 
(a) the result of which is that a client may enter into, offers to enter into or 
enters into any transaction in respect of a financial product with a product 
supplier; or 
(b) with a view to— 
 
(i) buying, selling or otherwise dealing in (whether on a discretionary 
or non-discretionary basis), managing, administering, keeping in 
safe custody, maintaining or servicing a financial product 
purchased by a client from a product supplier or in which the 
client has invested; 
(ii) collecting or accounting for premiums or other moneys payable by 
the client to a product supplier in respect of a financial product; or 
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(iii)receiving, submitting or processing the claims of a client against a 
product supplier”. 
 
Also of importance is the express exclusion contained in s 1(3)(a) which states 
that, for purposes of the Act, “advice” does not include: 
“(i) factual advice given merely— 
 
(aa) on the procedure for entering into a transaction in respect 
of any financial product; 
(bb) in relation to the description of a financial product; 
(cc) in answer to routine administrative queries; 
(dd) in the form of objective information about a particular 
financial product; or 
(ee) by the display or distribution of promotional material; 
 
(ii) an analysis or report on a financial product without any express or 
implied recommendation, guidance or proposal that any particular 
transaction in respect of the product is appropriate to the 
particular investment objectives, financial situation or particular 
needs of a client”. 
 
 
A General Code of Conduct for authorised financial services providers and 
representatives was published in terms of s. 15 of the Act, which Code contains equally 
detailed provisions relating to:- 
 
(a) The disclosure of  information in respect to product suppliers (s 4); 
(b) The furnishing of advice (s 8); 
(c) Advertising and direct marketing (s 14); and 
(d) Complaints resolution (s 15). 
 
    The Code defines “direct marketing” as “the rendering of financial services by 
way of telephone, Internet, media insert, direct mail, or electronic mail …” and 
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“writing” as including “communication by telefax or any appropriate electronic 
medium…”.  It will clearly apply to the selling of long-term insurance policies through 
the electronic medium.  It was pointed out above that “the rendering of financial 
services” involves the rendering of advice or the rendering of an intermediary service or a 
combination of the two.  The definition of “direct marketers” in the Code is important, as 
it distinguishes by implication between the rendering of financial services in the “normal 
course of  business” and the rendering of financial services by way of direct marketing.  
Where the services are rendered in the “normal course of business” the provisions 
contained in Parts III, IV, VI and VII must be complied with.  Parts III, IV, VI and VII 
each refer to “a provider other than a direct marketer”. 
  
If, however, the services are rendered by way of direct marketing, the provisions 
contained in Part X applies.  It provides, as is the case in Parts III, IV, VI and VII, for the 
furnishing of information on the product supplier, information on the FSP, information 
about the financial service rendered (the product) and the manner in which advice must 
be rendered.   
 
Part X of the General Code, and in particular Paragraph 15 thereof, contains the 
requirements that will be applicable to a direct marketer when it offers the sale of long-
term insurance policies through the Internet.  It therefore has direct relevance to the topic 
of this paper.  Paragraph 15 states that a direct marketer must “at the earliest reasonable 
opportunity” furnish a client with the following information: 
 “(a)  The business or trade name of the direct marketer; 
(b) confirmation whether the direct marketer is a licensed financial    
service provider and details of the financial services which the 
direct marketer is authorised to provide in terms of the relevant 
license and any conditions or restrictions applicable thereto; 
(c) telephone contact details of direct marketer (unless the contact was 
initiated by the client); 
(d)  telephone contact details of the compliance department of the 
direct marketer; 





Paragraph 15(2) contains requirements that must be met when “when providing 
a client with advice in respect of a product”.  By implication, a direct marketer will 
therefore not always or necessarily enter the arena of “giving advice” when it  renders a 
financial service, even if it includes entering into a transaction with a client.  As pointed 
out above, that “advice” does not include mere factual information about a product or the 
procedure to be followed when entering into a transaction in respect thereof.  It is 
submitted that a long-term assurer that sells long-term insurance policies through the 
Internet, will in certain instances be able to sell long-term insurance policies without also 
providing advice, as defined.  If a client however requires advice before entering into a 
transaction or at any stage during the process, it is argued that such advice can be 
rendered through the Internet whilst maintaining compliance with the Code.  In this 
regard Paragraph 15(2) states that, where advice is furnished, a direct marketer must 
“make enquiries to establish whether the financial product or products concerned will be 
appropriate, regard being had to the client’s risk profile and financial needs, and 
circumstances.”  It is entirely possible to obtain such information from the client 
electronically. 
 
Part II of the Code contains “General Provisions” applicable to FSP’s.  It 
contains detailed provisions applicable to “representations made and information 
provided to a client by a provider”.  Included in the provisions are the following: 
“Representations made and information provided to a client by the 
provider— 
 
(i)    must be factually correct; 
(ii)   must be provided in plain language, avoid uncertainty or confusion 
and not be misleading; 
(iii)  must be adequate and appropriate in the circumstances of the 
particular financial service, taking into account the factually 
established or reasonably assumed level of knowledge of the client; 
(iv)   must be provided timeously so as to afford the client reasonably 
sufficient time to make an informed decision about the proposed 
transaction; 
(v)   may, subject to the provisions of this Code, be provided orally and, 
at the client’s request, confirmed in writing within a reasonable 
time after such request; 
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(vi)  must, where provided in writing or by means of standard forms or 
format, be in a clear and readable print size, spacing and format; 
(vii) must, as regards all amounts, sums, values, charges, fees, 
remuneration or monetary obligations mentioned or referred to 
therein and payable to the product supplier or the provider, be 
reflected in specific monetary terms: Provided that where any such 
amount, sum, value, charge, fee, remuneration or monetary 
obligation is not reasonably pre-determinable, its basis of 
calculation must be adequately described; and 
(viii)  need not be duplicated or repeated to the same client unless 
material or significant changes affecting that client occur, or the 
relevant financial service renders it necessary, in which case a 
disclosure of the changes to the client must be made without 
delay”. 
 
Policing compliance: the Financial Services Board 
 
Compliance and adherence to both the LTI and FAIS Acts is policed by the Financial 
Services Board (“FSB”) established in terms of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 
1990.   In terms of s 3(a) of the FSB Act it is the duty of the FSB  “to supervise the 
compliance with laws regulating financial institutions and the provision of financial 
services”.   All providers of financial services must report annually to the FSB on their 
compliance with the abovementioned legislation and any business procedure that offers 
online selling of long-term insurance products will therefore have to be included in such 
reporting.  Non-compliance with the abovementioned legislation could have grave 
consequences for a financial services provider as it could ultimately lead to the 
withdrawal of its authorisation or licence.    
 
In an article that appeared in the “New South Wales Society for Computers and 
the Law Journal”,14  Charles Schofield and Henry Davis York discuss the impacts of the 
Financial Services Reform (“FSR”) that came into force in Australia during March 2004.  
They point out that financial institutions are “heavy users of technology” and that the 
FSR regime could have a broad impact on their information technology systems. They 
                                                
14 Schofield S and Davis York H,  FSR Impacts on Financial Services Technology, New South 
Wales Society for Computers and the Law, Journal: December 2004, Issue 58 
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highlight the areas of expected impact as licensing (the licence to operate), disclosure and 
conduct.  After pointing out the various disclosure requirements that apply to the 
provision of financial services in Australia, they state:  
 
“These disclosure obligations, in the context of financial services technology, 
have the greatest impact on the online delivery of financial services.  
Organisations providing financial products online, for example, need to ensure 
that their IT systems are capable of delivering an up to date product disclosure 
statement to the customer at or before the time the product is offered or issued to 
the customer”.  
 
They also warn that organisations must be able to prove what disclosures were 
made to the customer or customers should it ever be called into question.  They 
emphasise the importance of the capability of IT systems of recording disclosures and 
that “systems need to be tested regularly to demonstrate that they are providing 
disclosure when required, and testing results need to be retained for future proof, if 
needed”.   According to Schofield and York, IT systems can also be used to “prompt 
complaint behaviour”.  By this they mean that software can be used to issue an 
“automated prompt”.  The system can be programmed to require acknowledgment from 
the client that advice has been given before processing a transaction.  This can provide an 
audit trail to the financial services provider whereby it can monitor and demonstrate its 
compliance to regulatory requirements.   
 
 
The Life Offices Association of South Africa  
 
The Life Offices Association of South Africa (the “LOA”) is a voluntary association 
formed by long-term insurance companies doing business in South Africa.  Its objectives 
are to “promote a better understanding of life insurance among the general population of 
the country, represent the industry and its policyholders in negotiations with the 
authorities and [to] regulate their industry”.  Through the LOA, the industry regulates 
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itself voluntarily by adherence to several Codes of Conduct15.  These Codes deal with 
various aspects of the long-term insurance industry, and includes inter alia Codes such 
as: 
 
• the Code on the Maintenance of  the Life Register 
• the Code on the Demarcation of  Health Insurance an Medical Schemes business 
• the Code on Good Practice for Disability Insurance 
• the Code on Medical Requirements, Medical Report forms and related matters 
• the Code on the Replacement of Policies. 
 
Several of the Codes contain provisions that will have to be borne in mind when 
offering long-term insurance policies for sale through the Internet.  Examples of such 
provisions are: 
 
• Paragraph 4 of the Code on the Life Register that requires life assurers to inform 
the LOA of “any written applications for new policies”.  Member offices are 
required by Paragraph 8 of the Code to obtain a signed “authorisation” from an 
applicant whereby medical information relating to the application may be shared 
with other assurers; 
• In terms of the Code on Medical Requirements, standard medical report forms 
and declarations must be used by all life assurers; and 
• The Code on Replacements aims to prevent the potentially harmful practice of  
advising clients to replace existing policies with new policies.  The risk that is 
being regulated is of an intermediary recommending new products not strictly in 
the interests of the client but in order to generate fresh commission.  The Code 
therefore states as its “basic rule” the following: 
 
“The basic rule is that when a proposal is sought or received in respect of any 
policy or variation of a policy, it is the duty of the intermediary (and, in 
respect of direct marketing by a member office, the duty of the member office) 
to establish whether such policy or variation is a replacement policy, and if 




so to ensure that the client is properly counseled as required by this Code, 
PPR and/or FAIS on the consequences of a replacement and is enabled to 
take the decision to replace on a fully informed basis.” 
 
 
From the above it is clear that a long-term assurer that sells policies through the 
Internet, will have to ensure that all the necessary disclosures are made and information 
and declarations are obtained from a client, as prescribed by the FAIS- and LTI Acts as 
well as the various Codes of Conduct applicable to the business.  Discussed below  are 
the various techniques that can be used on a website to bring information to the attention 
of a client and how to prove that the client has applied his or her mind thereto and, where 
necessary, that he or she has agreed to particular terms, before proceeding with an online 
transaction16. 
 
Other legislation: The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 38 of 2001 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2 of 2000 (“FICA”) was promulgated essentially 
to combat money-laundering activities.  It established a Financial Intelligence Centre 
(“FIC”) whose duty it is “to make information collected by it available to investigating 
authorities”.  It furthermore forces “accountable institutions” to obtain and store certain 
fields of information about their clients, before entering into transactions with them.  
Such information relates inter alia to the client’s identity, physical address and source of 
funds.  The information must not only be obtained, but also verified.  Any “suspicious 
transactions”, as defined, must be reported to the FIC. 
 
Included in the list of “accountable institutions” are long-term assurers.  A long-
term assurer may therefore not enter into a long-term insurance contract with a client, 
before first identifying and verifying the identity of such client.  Not all transactions are 
however “reportable” in terms of the Act.  The Regulations to the Act contain the 
following important exemptions: 
 
                                                
16 Pages 30 and 31  
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“(a) any long term insurance policy which is a fund policy or a fund 
member policy as defined in the Long-term Insurance Act, 1998 and 
the regulations thereto and in respect of which the policyholder is a 
pension fund, provident fund or retirement annuity fund approved in 
terms of the Income Tax Act, 1962; 
 
(b)  ……….……….; 
 
(c)  ………….……; 
 
(d)  ……………….; 
 
(e)  ……..………...; 
 
(f)  any long term insurance policy which provides benefits only upon 
the death, disability, sickness or injury of the life insured under the 
policy; 
 
(g)  any long-term insurance policy in respect of which recurring 
premiums are paid which will amount to an annual total not 
exceeding R25 000,00, subject to the condition that the provisions of 
Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 of the Act have to be complied with in 
respect of every client— 
 
(i) who increases the recurring premiums so that the amount of  
R25 000,00 is exceeded; 
 
(ii)who surrenders such a policy within three years after its  
commencement; or 
 
(iii)to whom that accountable institution grants a loan or extends 
credit against the security of such a policy within three years 
after its commencement; 
 
(h)  any long term insurance policy in respect of which a single premium 
not exceeding R50 000,00 is payable, subject to the condition that 
the provisions of Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 of the Act have to be 




(i)  who surrenders such a policy within three years after its      
commencement; or 
 
(ii)  to whom that accountable institution grants a loan or extends 
credit against the security of such a policy within three years 
after its commencement; 
 
(i)    ……………….; 
 
(j)    ……….……..; 
 
(k) any other long term insurance policy on condition that within the first 
three years after the commencement of the policy the surrender value 
of the policy does not exceed twenty per cent of the value of the 
premiums paid in respect of that policy.” 
 
 
Where a long-term assurer wishes to enter, over the Internet, into a transaction 
for the sale of a policy that does not fall within the exemptions, particular care will have 
to be taken to comply with the Act.  Careful consideration will have to be given to the 
extent to which an accountable institution is required to identify and verify the identity of 
a prospective client.  In terms of Regulation 3 an accountable institution must obtain from 
a client his or her full names, date of birth, identity number and residential address.  This 
information must be verified by “comparing these particulars with …an identification 
document of that person…or another document issued to that person…which …bears…a 
photograph of that person…”.  The residential address must be verified “by comparing 
these particulars with information which can reasonably be expected to achieve such 
verification and is obtained by reasonably practical means”.  It is generally accepted that 
verification can be obtained by requiring a prospective client to produce his or her bar-
coded ID book which is then perused to verify the person’s full names, identity number 
and date of birth.  The client is then expected to produce any one of a variety of 
documents that would verify his or her residential address, such as a utilities bill, 




Such verification can logically only occur when the transaction takes place in a 
so-called “face-to-face” situation.  The question is therefore how to establish and verify a 
client’s identity and residential particulars in a “non face-to-face” transaction as 
envisaged by a transaction over the Internet.  Regulation 18 deals with “verification in 
absence of contact person” and provides as follows: 
“If an accountable institution obtained information in terms of these 
regulations about a natural or legal person, partnership or trust without 
contact in person with that natural person, or with a representative of that 
legal person or trust, the institution must take reasonable steps to 
establish the existence or to establish or verify the identity of that natural 
or legal person, partnership or trust, taking into account any guidance 
notes concerning the verification of identities which may apply to that 
institution.” 
 
It is submitted that a client’s identity can thus be established by obtaining a 
faxed copy of his or her identity document and by verifying it by comparing it to the 
records of the Department of Home Affairs or any other records held by a independent 
third party such as a national credit bureau.  Regulation 18 does not mention the 
verification of a person’s residential address but it is submitted that this is a mere 
oversight and that the residential address may similarly be verified by an independent 
third party such as a local municipality. 
 
It is clear, at least, that it was the intention of the legislature, in enacting 
Regulation 18, to allow for transactions that are conducted in a non face-to-face situation 
such as over the Internet.  It is regrettable that the legislator did not give a clearer 
indication of how such verification may take place as there could be those that argue that 
strict rules should apply to non face-to-face transactions due to the increased risk of 
criminal abuse. 
 
Such stricter rules in case of non face-to-face transactions could represent an 




It is interesting to note that the Australian Financial Transactions Reports Act of 
1988 which also requires the identification and verification of clients for purposes of 
combating money laundering; and that certain original documents must be produced; and 
for the client to sign in the presence of the party keeping the reference or undertaking 
verification.  In an article dealing with proposed changes to the Australian Uniformed 
Consumer Credit Code17, the authors considered proposed changes to the Australian 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code which would enable credit contracts to be formed 
electronically and for documents and notices related thereto to be given electronically.  
 
They regard the Financial Transaction Reports Act as a “major legislature 
obstacle to transacting with a customer solely by electronic means”.  They also point out 
that expected changes to the Australian money laundering legislation to bring it in 
alignment with the recommendations of the International Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering dated June 2003, could require a higher standard of customer due 
diligence obligations to be adhered to.  They warn that it is “at this stage it is difficult to 
predict to what extent this will hinder the ability of lenders to transact electronically with 
customers”.  A similar process of tightening client identification and verification 
requirements might also occur in South Africa as our FIC Act was also drafted with the 
Financial Action Task Force Principles as a guideline.  As in Australia, it is therefore to 
be seen to what extent anti money laundering provision would future hinder the ability of 









                                                
17 Lodge T and Kho R, Online Transactions between Members and Borrowers – Proposed 
Changes to the Uniformed Consumer Credit Code, New South Wales Society for Computer and 







REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Long-term assurers who wish to sell their products online will have to study the 
provisions contained in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 
2002 (“the ECT Act”) carefully, as the Act applies to almost all online activity.  The Act 
applies not only to websites that allow transactions to be performed online, but also 
where they merely provide information.  It also applies to the use of electronic 
communications where those communications are intended to have legal consequences.  
This Chapter will therefore study the various provisions contained in the ECT Act, in as 
far as they would apply to the online selling of long-term insurance products.  
 
 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2002 
 
The ECT Act was promulgated on 31 July 2002 and took effect by Proclamation on 30 
August 2002.  The Act was drafted and passed by Parliament to regulate various aspects 
relating to electronic communications and transactions.  S 2 of the Act which deals with 
its objects, confirm that it was promulgated “to enable and facilitate electronic 
communications and transactions in the public interest”.  The section contains a list of 
various objectives that the Act aims to achieve in support of the mentioned main object, 
which includes inter alia:- 
 
“(a) recognise the importance of the information economy for the economic 
and social prosperity of the Republic; 
(b) ………. 
(c) promote the understanding and, acceptance of and growth in the number 
of electronic transactions in the Republic; 
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(d) remove and prevent barriers to electronic communications and 
transactions in the Republic; 
(e) promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic 
communications and transactions; 
(f) ……… 
(g) ………. 
(h) ensure that electronic transactions in the Republic conform to the highest 
international standards; 
(i) ………. 
(j) develop a safe, secure and effective environment for the consumer, 
business and the government to conduct an use electronic transactions; 
(k) promote the development of electronic transactions services which are 
responsive to the needs of users and consumers.” 
 
The Act also contains various provisions aimed at promoting a sound national e-
strategy for the Republic of South Africa intended to promote universal access to 
electronic communications and transactions and maximise the benefits of electronic 
transactions including provision of the services to the historically disadvantaged persons 
and communities of South Africa.  It must also promote the development of human 
resources within a suitable national e-strategy and the development of processes, 
programmes and infrastructure through which SMME’s can benefit. 
 
 Of particular importance for the purposes of this paper is Chapter III of the Act 
which deals with electronic transactions.  The Chapter “enables” electronic transactions 
by giving legal recognition to data messages.  The various sections of the Chapter and 
their importance to online transactions will be discussed below. 
 
 It is necessary to note that most of the provisions contained in Chapter III of the 
Act follow the wording of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce18 which was adopted in 1996.  The 
Commission was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations to work 
towards harmonisation and unification of the Law of International Trade.  The Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce is intended “to facilitate the use of modern means of 
                                                




communications and storage of information”.  The Model Law relies heavily on the so-
called doctrine of functional equivalence.  In terms of this doctrine or approach, rules 
must be formulated to ensure that the electronic media provides a functional equivalent 
for paper-based concepts such as “writing”, “signature” and “original”.  These aspects 
play an important role in the formation of agreements and therefore in the world of 
commerce.  As more and more commercial transactions are conducted through the 
electronic medium, it becomes more and more important for the Law to provide certainty 
in respect of such transactions.  The fact that the communications and transactions are 
conducted through the electronic medium means by implication that the traditional 
“paper contracts” and “signatures” are no longer available to provide certainty in respect 
of the many issues arising out of commercial agreements.  The Model Law therefore aims 
to provide standards by which the legal value to be attached to electronic messages can 
be assessed.  The intention is that all Member States should “give favourable 
consideration to the Model Law when they enact or revise their laws in view of the need 
for uniformity of the law applicable to alternatives to paper-based methods of 
communication and storage of information.”19   As stated above, much of the wording of 
Chapter III of the ECT Act follows the wording contained in the Model Law. 
 
 
Legal recognition of data messages 
 
 S 11(1) of the Act can, in many respects, be regarded as the key to the legal 
recognition of electronic transactions.  The section gives legal recognition to “data 
messages” which is defined in the Act as “data generated, sent, received or stored by 
electronic means”.20   It includes voice messages where it is used in an automated 
transaction and stored data.  In terms of s. 11(1), data messages are given legal 
recognition by stating that “information is not without legal force and effect merely on the 
grounds that it is wholly or partly in the form of a data message”.  This key provision 
makes it possible for parties to a transaction to rely on information pertaining to the 
                                                
19 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Resolution 51/162 of 16 
December 1996 
20 Sec 1 of the ECT Act 
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transaction regardless of the fact that it does not exist on paper, as was traditionally the 
case, but exists only in electronic form.  Previously, a party to a contract wishing to rely 
on information which only exists in electronic form could have found it difficult if not 
impossible to prove that such information must be given legal recognition. 
 
 
“Incorporation by reference” 
 
 S 11(2) states that information merely referred to in a data message enjoys the 
same treatment.  This sub-section refers to the doctrine of incorporation by reference 
found in our Contract Law.  In terms of this doctrine a contract can refer to information 
or legal implications not contained in the contract itself, but contained in a separate 
document or location.  Although it is therefore not contained in the agreement itself, it 
will still have legal effect and relevance to the agreement.  Numerous disclosures that 
must be made to a prospective policyholder were listed in Chapter II above.  The 
electronic medium is ideally suited to referring a prospective client to various Codes, 
Regulations and stipulations which must be brought to his or her attention during the 
course of an electronic transaction.  Such disclosures and information can be 
“incorporated by reference” by making use of various methods provided by the 
electronic medium such as click-wrap and web-wrap functionality.   
 
Current technology provides for at least three ways of bringing information 
referred to, to the attention of a person conducting a transaction on a web-site.  All three 
methods make use of the so-called “hyperlink”.  A “hyperlink” is a “shortcut” to other 
documents embedded in the text of an HTML document.  The reader of the HTML 
document does not have to type in the address of the other document in order to visit and 
read it.  When a cursor is moved over such hyperlink it “shows up” or “changes” so as 
to alert the reader of its existence. 
 
 A hyperlink may, firstly, be in the form merely as a reference at the bottom of a 
page.  The reader will of own volition have to enter the link if interested.  This form is 
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referred to as “browse-wrap”.  A second method is to require the reader to click on the 
words “I agree” before being allowed to proceed with the transaction.  This is referred to 
as “click-wrap” and does not check whether the reader has in fact entered the other 
document.  The third method actually displays the full content of the other document and 
requires the reader to click the words “I agree” or “accept” before being able to proceed 
with the transaction.  This method is often referred to as “web-wrap”.  It is submitted that 
financial services providers will have to consider the stricter forms of hyperlink such as 
the “click-wrap” or “web-wrap” methods if it wishes to satisfy itself and the regulatory 
authorities that it is compliant with the various requirement of disclosure referred to in 
this paper.  A service provider will have to prove that the disclosures were indeed made 
to the client in such a way that he could not have continued with the transaction without 
applying his or her mind to the relevant information contained in the disclosure.   
 
 In the United States case of Caspi v The Microsoft Network, LLC21, the Superior 
Court of New Jersey Appellate Division gave consideration to the validity and 
enforceability of a forum selection clause contained in an online subscriber agreement of 
the Microsoft Network (MSN), an online computer service.  When a client applied to 
become a member of the service, the web-site through which the transaction was 
concluded would prompt such applicant to view multiple computer screens of 
information which included a membership agreement containing the clause in dispute.  
The person would only be able to complete registration after clicking “I agree” as to the 
terms of the agreement.  It was argued that the clause in question was essentially “hidden 
in the fine print”.  The court however came to the conclusion that “there was nothing 
extraordinary about the size or placement of the forum selection clause text” and that it 
was in the same format as the other provisions of the contract.  The court concluded that 
the complainant “must be taken to have known that they were entering into a contract 
and no good purpose, consonant with the dictates of reasonable reliability in commerce, 
would be served by permitting them to disavow particular provisions or the contract as a 
whole”.   
                                                
21 Caspi v The Microsoft Network L.L.C. Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 323 N.J. 




The following was also said in the case of Specht v Netscape Communications 
Corp.22:  “Whether governed by the common-law or by Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a 
manifestation of agreement between the parties…….. a consumer’s clicking on a 
download button does not communicate as sent to contractual terms if the offer did not 
make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would signify as sent to 
those terms.”  On the facts of the case, the court found that “a reference to the existence 
of licensed terms on a sub-merged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on enquiry 
with constructive notice of those terms.  Internet users may have, as defendants put it, ‘as 
much time as they need’ to scroll through multiple screens on a web-page, but there is no 
reason to assume to that viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because 
screens are there.  When products are ‘free’ and users are invited to download them in 
the absence of reasonably conspicuous notice  that they are about to bind themselves to 
contract terms, the transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those in the 
paper world of arms-length bargaining”. 
 
 It is submitted that the courts in both cases referred to clearly applied the 
underlying and traditional principles of contract formation, which includes the forming of 
a proper consensus as to all the material terms that would apply to an agreement.  
Whatever method is used by long-term assurers offering transaction on a web-site, it 
should ensure that all material terms of the agreement as well as the various disclosures 
required by applicable legislation are properly brought under the attention of the client.   
 
 Equally, key to the enablement of electronic transactions is the provision 
contained in s 12 of the Act that any requirement in Law that a document or information 
must be in writing will be met if it is in the form of a data message.  The data message 
must for obvious reasons be “accessible in the manner usable for subsequent reference”.   
 
                                                
22 Specht v Netscape Communications Corp, 306 F.3D17 (2d CIR. 2002) 
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 Our law does not require a long-term insurance contract to be in writing, as in the 
case of agreement of sales in respect of immovable property.  Reference was made 
above23 to s 48 of the Long-term Insurance Act that requires the assurer to provide a 
policyholder with a “written summary” of a long-term policy not later than 60 days after 
the transaction.  S 48 is therefore such a “requirement in law” referred to in s 12 and the 
summary can be provided to the policyholder in the form of a data message which must 
be “accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference”.  The summary document 




Electronic signatures and encryption 
 
S 13 of the Act deals with electronic signatures.  It is important to understand that the 
term “electronic signature” or “digital signatures” does not refer to a “digital image” or 
“scanned version” of a person’s handwritten or even typed signature.  It is rather an 
electronic identifier24 that utilises cryptography measures which ensures the integrity and 
authenticity of information linked to the identifier, or “signature”.  To fully understand 
the concept of a digital signature it is first necessary to understand encryption and the role 
that it plays (and benefits that it brings) in the electronic media. 
 
 Data messages sent electronically over the Internet are normally sent in the form 
of “plain text”.  Sending it over the Internet in this form can be described as the 
equivalent of sending “electronic post cards” which can be read by any person who 
receives or intercepts the message.  Where the sender of such a message does not wish it 
to be read by the wrong party, for instance where confidential personal or banking 
information is exchanged over the Internet during the course of an electronic transaction, 
encryption technology can be used to encode the information.  This is called encryption.  
The technology underlying encryption consists basically of two components, being an 
                                                
23 Page 12 




algorithm and a key.  Algorithms are complex mathematical processes whereas the key is 
needed to “unlock” an encrypted message.  In some instances the same key is used for 
both the encryption process and decryption.  In other methods, different keys are used to 
encrypt and to decrypt.25   Currently, technology provides for three methods of 
cryptography being “secret key cryptography”, “public key cryptography” and “quantum 
cryptography keys”.  Secret key cryptography is used where the same key is used by the 
different parties to an electronic communication where public key cryptography utilises a 
system where two keys are used, one which remains private and one which is made 
public.  It follows that both keys are required to decrypt an encoded message and 
confidentiality is therefore ensured for as long as the private key remains safe.  Most 
online banking transactions are protected by this form of encryption.  The bank holds and 
protects the private key whilst the public key is provided to customers.   The “coding” of 
data messages in this manner is also referred to as Secure Sockets Layer or “SSL”.  Many 
websites use this protocol to exchange confidential information.26
 
Quantum cryptography keys refers to the use of photons or light particles for the 
encryption of data messages, rather than mathematical algorithms.  Any interference with 
the photons or light particles alters its quantum properties which alerts the parties to the 
communication that the transmission was not secure.  The photons are not used for the 
carrying of the actual message, but rather for the transfer of the cryptographic key. 
 
 The fact that data messages can be encoded in this manner has the following 
benefits:- 
 
 Authentication:  It makes it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its 
origin; 
 Integrity:  It makes it possible for the receiver of a message to establish whether a 
data message has been modified whilst in transit; 
                                                
25 http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalavs/node.asp?id=2157 (accessed 01/04/06) 
26 http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SSL.html (accessed 08/04/06) 
35 
 
 Non-repudiation:  The sender of a data message cannot easily deny the fact that he 
or she sent the message or the contents thereof; 
 Confidentiality:  By using the encryption technology it is possible to ensure that 
only the intended recipient thereof can read it. 
 
The term “electronic signature” extends to more than the functional equivalent of 
a handwritten signature on a paper document.  An “electronic signature” not only 
identifies the person who communicated the information but also the contents of the data 
message.  This added dimension will be of great benefit to parties transacting with each 
other through electronic medium as it will ensure greater certainty where paper 
documentation and handwritten signatures have in the past given rise to many disputes. 
 
S 13 of the Act introduces two types of digital signatures into South African Law. 
It refers firstly to advanced electronic signatures.  An advanced electronic signature is 
issued by an independent and trusted third party entity which must be credited by the 
authorities.  The benefit of an advanced electronic signature is that it has a stronger 
evidential value than a “normal” electronic signature.  S 13(4) states that “an advanced 
electronic signature will be regarded as being valid, unless the contrary is proved.  A 
party wishing to dispute the validity thereof will therefore bear the onus to prove 
invalidity.” 
 
The second or “normal” type of electronic signature, referred to above, is defined 
in the Act as “data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data 
…. which is intended by the user to serve as a signature”.    It was pointed out above that 
“data” means electronic representations of information in any form.  A normal electronic 
signature can therefore be anything ranging from a sender of an electronic message’s 
name that appears at the end of the message to a voice recording in which the author 
identifies himself by stating his name. 
 
Parties to an agreement may choose which form of electronic signature they 
require for the conclusion of the contract.  It is not necessary for parties to require the use 
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of an electronic signature at all as a valid agreement can still be concluded as long as 
their “expression of intent” can be established by the data message.27   
 
Electronic signatures however also have certain disadvantages.  Because it 
involves complex mathematical processes, users may struggle to understand the nature 
and application thereof.  It requires certification and a third party verification regime 
which leads to an inevitable cost implication. The opinion has also been expressed that 
digital signatures are “best suited for short-term contracts or documents which don’t 
requirement extensive archiving, such as purchase orders electronic funds transfers and 
contracts for access to online services”.28  
 
It is submitted that the levels of confidentiality and security currently provided by 
SSL protocols29, adequately caters for the requirements of long-term assurers wishing to 
sell their products online.  Our law does not require that a long-term insurance contract, 




Retention of documents and evidential weight 
 
The requirements laid down in the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in respect of 
obtaining and retaining a copy of the client’s identity document, have been discussed 
above.  Although FICA does not require the original identity document to be retained, it 
does require the copy of the identity document to be retained.  In terms of s 14 of the Act 
such copy can be retained in electronic form.  Reference was also made above to various 
provisions contained in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act that 
requires the retention of records evidencing disclosures made to the prospective 
policyholder, disclosures made by the policyholder to the assurer and record of advice 
                                                
27 Sec 13(5) 
28 Barnett P, The Write Stuff?  Recent developments in electronic signatures,  New South Wales 
Society for Computers and the Law, Journal : December 2001, Issue 46  
29 Discussed at page 34. 
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given prior to conclusion of the contract.  By virtue of secs 11, 14 and 15 of the Act, 
assurers can now store vast numbers of documentation in electronic form at a significant 
savings in costs. 
 
It is interesting to note that s 14 makes provision for possible changes that could 
be effected to a document as a result of transferring it into electronic form.  This is a clear 
reference to the application of software that transforms a written document consisting of 
words into an electronic word document.  The last mentioned word document in its 
electronic form might be different from the original document in various aspects, such as 
visual appearance and font size, although the contents remain virtually the same and is 
capable of manipulation. 
 
 S 15 of the Act deals with the admissibility and evidential weight of data 
messages.  The section was enacted in light of the difficulties brought about by the 
previous Computer Evidence Act No. 57, of 1983 that has now been repealed by the ECT 
Act.  Litigants wishing to rely on evidence which was in electronic format had to satisfy 
stringent requirements laid out in the Computer Evidence Act.  It required qualified 
persons to authenticate computer printouts representing the evidence.  This was often 
extremely difficult or impractical to the extent that parties to litigation found it extremely 
difficult to rely on electronic evidence. 
 
 S 15 of the Act now simplifies the production of evidence of data messages by 
effectively stating that it is admissible as evidence and that it must be given “due 
evidential weight”.  The section sets out the practise that a court must consider in 
assessing such “due evidential weight”.  This includes the following:- 
 
 
“(a) The reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, 
stored or communicated; 
(b) The reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message 
was maintained; 
(c) The manner in which its originator was identified; and 





 S 15(4) will be of great relief and assistance to parties wishing to rely on evidence 
of data messages in a court of law.  It states that a printout of such data message is 
admissible in evidence by its mere production in court.  It furthermore states that upon 
being certified to be correct by “an officer in the service of” the party tendering the 
evidence, it will be “rebuttable proof” of the facts contained in the copy.   Where the 
correctness of the contents of the copy or printout is therefore disputed, the onus will rest 
on the party disputing the correctness.  As in the case of s 11 mentioned above, this 
provision will be of great benefit to assurers wishing to enter into online transactions in 
respect of its products on a large scale.  The management personnel of long-term assurers 
will however be well advised to implement and follow programmes aimed at ensuring 
and documenting the integrity of the generation, storage and transmission of data 
messages and any documentation stored in electronic format.  Such programmes must be 
able to give adequate particulars of all procedures implemented in the event of the 
integrity of evidence being questioned.  The proper documentation of processes could be 
of tremendous assistance where key personnel, especially in the Information Technology 
field, might not be employed by the specific company anymore.  Personnel in this field of 
expertise often provide their services on a consultancy basis as opposed to full-time 
employment at a specific company.  This may prove to be problematic. 
 
 As stated above, most if not all the legislation applicable to long-term insurance 
transactions require the retention of documentation relating to transactions or the 
interaction between a long-term assurer and client.  It was already mentioned that the 
ECT Act enables such information to be retained in electronic form.  S 16 of the Act 
deals expressly with the retention of information and states that “where a law requires 
information to be retained, that requirement is met by retaining such information in the 
form of a data message”.  As is the case in ss 11 and 12 it requires that the information 
must be “accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference” and the holder of the 
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information must be able to demonstrate that the data message accurately represents the 
retained information. 
 
 S 16(1)(c) requires furthermore that the “origin and destination” as well as the 
date and time that it was sent or received, must be able to be shown.  Similar 
requirements are contained in s 17 which deals with the production of a document or 
information as opposed to the mere retention thereof.  It similarly requires the producer 
of a document or information to be able to show that the integrity of the information has 
been maintained.  The remarks made above in respect of the procedures and information 





S 20 of the Act deals with the formation of an agreement by means of “automated 
transactions”.  An “automated transaction” is defined by the Act as “an electronic 
transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by means of data messages in 
which the conduct or data messages of one or both parties are not reviewed by a natural 
person in the ordinary course of such natural person’s business or employment”.  S 20(a) 
confirms that an agreement may be formed “where an electronic agent performs an 
action required by law for agreement formation”.  An “electronic agent” is defined by 
the Act as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used 
independently to initiate an action or respond to data messages or performances in whole 
or in part, in an automated transaction”.   
 
The above is a clear reference to the growing trend in e-commerce of using 
computer programs or software to “act on behalf of” a party to an electronic transaction.  
An example of the application and utilisation of such software would be the computer 
program used by a company such as Kalahari.net in South Africa that offers inter alia 
books for sale over the Internet.  It invites any person to purchase books online 
whereafter the books are delivered by post or courier to the purchaser.  When the 
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purchaser concludes the transaction over the Internet on Kalahari.net’s website, he or she 
in fact interacts not with a natural person in the employ of the Kalahari.net company, but 
rather with a computer program designed and programmed to interact with the purchaser 
on behalf of Kalahari.net.  The conduct and data messages of the computer program 
employed by Kalahari.net is, for purposes of the transaction, not reviewed or controlled 
by a natural person in the employ of Kalahari.net.  The software or computer program 
used by Kalahari.net for this purpose, therefore acts as “electronic agent” on its behalf 
and binds Kalahari.net to a valid agreement of sale without any natural person in its 
employ reaching consensus with the purchaser on behalf of the company.   
 
Although the term “electronic agent” is used to give legal effect to the “actions” 
of the computer program, certain legal commentators point out that a computer program 
cannot be regarded as an “agent” in the legal sense of the word.  Although in our law an 
agent acts in terms of a mandate received from his or her principal, such agent is still 
capable of forming and expressing intent for purposes of reaching consensus. 
 
 Prof. Christie in his work on the “Law of Contract in South Africa”30 however 
reminds the reader that agreements can also be concluded tacitly.  An offer can be made 
tacitly or accepted tacitly.  If an offer is accepted tacitly it gives rise to a tacit contract or 
an implied contract.  It can also be referred to as a contract by conduct.  There is therefore 
in law no reason why it cannot be said that Kalahari.net in the example above, did not, 
through the conduct of the computer program, bind itself tacitly to a contract.  By inviting 
a client to make an offer for the purchase of a book and by programming the computer to 
confirm to the purchaser that an agreement has been concluded and that the book will be 
delivered, Kalahari.net tacitly accepted the purchaser’s offer. 
 
In an article entitled “Electronic Agents and the Formation of Contracts” 31 
Emily M Weitzenboeck refers to the difference of approach to the formation of a contract 
in civil law and common-law jurisdictions.  Following the emphasise on liberalism in the 
                                                
30 Christie R H, The Law of Contract, 4th Edition, Butterworths, 2001, page 92 




19th century in France, strong emphasize is placed in civil law jurisdictions on the 
“autonomy of the will” or the “supremacy of the inner will”.  In terms of this approach, 
also referred to as the subjective theory of consent, a court considering a dispute relating 
to the formation of agreements will examine the subjective intention of parties to an 
agreement.  According to the common-law, however, a party is considered bound to an 
agreement when his behaviour or actions indicate that he bound himself.  This is the so-
called objective approach.  She points out that English and American Law adopted the 
objective test of agreement.  She also points out that one would run into difficulties if one 
tried to apply the subjective approach to a contract where at least one of the parties made 
use of an intelligent agent, as it is not possible to look at the ‘inner psychological state of 
mind” of an electronic agent.  The objective test therefore suits the use of electronic 
agents better.   
 
In applying the objective test, a court giving consideration to the formation of an 
agreement “would apply the test of how a reasonable man in the shoes of the other 
contracting party would have interpreted the contractual statements made by the 
electronic agent, to see if they amounted either to a firm offer or an acceptance 
(depending on whether the offer was made by the agent or by the other party)”.  In such a 
case the actual internal workings of the electronic agent are not relevant. 
 
 In the same article, Weitzenboeck refers also to a model known as the Consumer 
Buying Behaviour (CBB) Model which was devised by Maes, Guttman and Moukas, 
members of the Software Agents Group at MIT Media Laboratory.  The model identified 
six fundamental stages in the buying process which are (1) need identification, (2) 
product brokering, (3) merchant brokering, (4) negotiation, (5) purchase and delivery, 
and (6) product service and evaluation.  She points out that the study conducted by the   
Software Agents Group found that  the “personalised, continuously-running and 
autonomous characteristics of agents” make them well suited for mediating consumer 
behaviour relating to information filtering and retrieval, personalised evaluations, 
complex co-ordination and time placed interactions.  It is therefore an ideal tool for 
purposes of the first stage referred to, being need identification.  Long-term assurers 
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wishing to employ electronic agents to facilitate or mediate transactions for their products 
which could involve the rendering of financial advice, will be heartened by this 
observation. 
 
Weitzenboeck also states the following, in summary:- 
 
“Agents will no doubt be employed to assist human interaction through 
the various stages of a transaction from product and merchant brokering 
through to negotiation, sale, distribution and payment.  It is not 
unreasonable to predict that, in time, agent technology will become 
sufficiently sophisticated to perform many if not all of these sorts of tasks 
without human oversight or intervention”32   
 
  As stated, s 20(a) confirms that an agreement may be formed through an 
electronic agent.  It states that such agreement may be formed where all parties to a 
transaction or either one of them uses an electronic agent. 
 
 In terms of s 20(d) a party interacting with an electronic agent will not be held to 
the agreement unless he or she was afforded the opportunity of reviewing the terms of the 
agreement “prior to agreement formation”.  Any computer program or software 
implemented by a long-term assurer must therefore provide an opportunity to the 
prospective client to review the terms of the agreement before the contract is actually 
concluded.  An agreement is also not valid where a person who interacted with an 
electronic agent made a material error during such interaction.  To rely on the invalidity 
of an agreement in case of material error, the party relying on such invalidity will have to 
prove the following33:- 
 
“(a) The electronic agent did not provide that person with an opportunity to 
prevent or correct the error; 
(b) that person notifies the other person of the error as soon as practicable 
after that person has learned of it; 
                                                
32 Weitzenboeck op cit page 11 
33 Sec 20(e) 
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(c) that person takes reasonable steps, including steps that  conform to the 
other person’s instructions to return any performance received, or, if 
instructed to do so, to destroy that performance; and 
(d) that person has not used or received any material benefit or value from 
any performance received from the other person” 
 
In the case of an automated transaction relating to a long-term insurance product a 
person wishing to escape liability on the ground that he or she had made a material error 
will therefore have to show that the website did not provide him or her with an 
opportunity to correct the error and that he or she had notified the assurer of the error as 
soon as practicable after becoming aware of it. 
 
 The fact that s 20(e)(iv) also includes reference to the receipt of any material 
benefit or value can in the case of a long-term insurance policy be compared to receipt of 
any policy benefits.  It is to be seen whether the fact that a person enjoyed death or 
disability cover for a period will in itself be regarded as “any material benefit or value 
from any performance received from …..” the assurer.  It is submitted that the mere 
enjoyment of cover as opposed to receipt of the payment of benefits will not constitute 
material benefit or value for purposes of s 20(e)(iv). 
 
 It is important to note that s 20(c) creates a presumption that a party will be bound 
to the terms of an agreement where it utilised an electronic agent to form the agreement.  
Such presumption exists whether the company reviewed the actions of its electronic agent 
or the terms of the agreement, or not. 
 
 
Communication of data messages and time and place of contracting 
 
Part II of Chapter 3 of the Act contains provisions relating to the communication of data 
messages and therefore, by implication, to online contracting.  It contains provisions 
relating to the time when and place where an agreement is concluded;34  the time when a 
                                                
34 Sec 22(2) 
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data message is regarded as having been sent by the originator;35 the time and place that a 
data message is regarded as having been received by the addressee 36 and the attribution 
of a data message to the originator.37   The provisions contained in Part II of Chapter 3 
are not obligatory and the parties to an electronic transaction are therefore free to agree 
on a different arrangement in respect of the above issues. 
 
In terms of s 22(2) an agreement concluded between parties by means of the 
exchange of data messages is concluded “at the time when and place where the 
acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror”.  As the section is not obligatory, a 
life assurer can insist that agreements concluded online be regarded as having been 
concluded at the place of business of the assurer.  The obvious benefit to the assurer of 
such an agreement is the fact that disputes arising from the agreement would in all 
probability then fall within the jurisdictional area of the assurer.   
 
It could be advisable for long-term assurers to insist on such an arrangement as it 
would not always be able to argue that (a) it had extended an offer to the prospective 
client which was open for acceptance and (b) that the agreement was therefore concluded 
when it received the data message containing the client’s acceptance.  In most instances a 
person applying for a long-term insurance policy completes an application form made 
available by the assurer.  The information contained in the application form is then 
generally regarded as constituting an offer extended by the applicant for acceptance by 
the assurer.  Often, as a result of its underwriting requirements, an assurer might decide to 
impose a health exclusion or a loading on the premium to be paid by the insured and it is 
then generally accepted that such loading or exclusion constitutes a counter-offer made 
by the assurer to the prospective client.  It is then for the prospective client to consider 
and accept if he or she so wishes to accept the counter-offer of the assurer.  It is therefore 
clear that, unless it is made clear by the assurer that contracts of insurance concluded by 
way of data messages will be regarded as having been concluded at the place of business 
of the assurer, policyholders declaring disputes with the assurer might in light of s 22(2) 
                                                
35 Sec 23(a) 
36 Sec 23(b) 
37 Sec 25 
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be able to argue that the contract of insurance was concluded in their own jurisdictional 
area. 
 
S 23 creates three important presumptions.  In the first instance a data message 
used for the conclusion or performance of an agreement will be regarded as having been 
sent by the originator when it enters an “information system” that is outside of the control 
of the originator.  The term “information system” is defined in s 1 of the Act as “a 
system for generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying or otherwise processing 
data messages and includes the Internet”.  “Information system” can therefore be a 
party’s Internet services provider, a server used by a long-term assurer who receives and 
stores data messages, a mailbox on a personal computer of an individual person or even a 
fax machine.  In all such cases the originator of the data message cannot retrieve it once it 
is sent to the information system of the addressee.  Where the originator and the 
addressee share the same information system, a data message will be regarded as having 
been sent as soon as it is capable of being retrieved by the addressee.  It is not clear to 
what extent an addressee’s subjective inability to access his information system will be 
upheld as a defence to and deemed receipt in terms of s 23(a).  Examples of subjective 
inability could be the fact that the addressee did not open his or her e-mails due to 
hardware or software failures or viruses.  It is unlikely that the addressee would easily 
succeed with such a defence38. 
 
The second presumption created by s 23 is contained in s 23(b).  A data message 
will be presumed to having been received by an addressee when it enters the information 
system of the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee. 
 
 The third presumption relates to the originator as well as the addressee’s usual 
place of business or residence.  It will be presumed that data messages were sent from 
and received at the originator or addressees’ usual places of business or residence.  In a 
similar manner s 25 creates a rebuttable presumption that a data message was authored 
and transmitted by the originator where it was sent by him or her personally or a person 
                                                
38 Buys et al op cit page 98 
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acting on his or her behalf.  The presumption also applies where a data message was sent 
by an information system that was programmed to act on behalf of the originator.   
 
Reference was made above to the use of an electronic agent during the conclusion 
of an automated transaction and this section makes it clear that a message created by such 
electronic agent will be presumed to have been sent by the electronic agent.  If a person 
or entity making use of such electronic agent wishes to escape the consequences of a data 
message sent incorrectly by its electronic agent, it would bear the onus to prove that the 
information system did not properly “execute such programming”.  It is submitted that a 
party wishing to escape liability in such a situation would in any event bear the onus to 
prove that the electronic agent malfunctioned and it was therefore strictly speaking not 




























CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ONLINE TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
In this Chapter, the various consumer protection measures contained in the ECT Act will 
be studied.  Reference will also be made throughout to consumer protection provisions 
contained in other legislation that apply to the selling of long-term insurance products. 
The Chapter will also consider the recently published Protection of Personal Information 
Bill as it will have an important impact on the processing of personal information that 
will always form an integral part of online transactions. 
 
 
Consumer protection under the ECT Act 
 
Chapter VII of the ECT Act provides online consumers with a number of rights that will 
apply to online transactions, additional to the rights already referred to above in terms of 
the legislation applicable to the long-term insurance industry.  In many instances the 
provisions correspond with the rights provided by the legislation referred to and long-
term assurers offering their products online will have to ensure that they adhere to the 
minimum standards and requirements laid down in both sets of legislation.  It must 
however be noted that s 44 which provides for the cooling-off period of seven days is not 
applicable to an electronic transaction for financial services, which in terms of s 42(2)(a) 
includes “investment services, insurance and reinsurance operations, banking services 
and operations relating to dealings in securities”. 
 
The rights afforded by the ECT Act can be summarised as follows:-  
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 The right to disclose information about the product supplier, it’s goods, services 
and prices39; 
 The right to review a summary of an electronic transaction before deciding to 
proceed, amend or terminate a transaction40; 
 The right to a secure online payment system41; 
 The right to a cooling-off period of seven days42; 
 Rights relating to the receipt of spam communications43; and 
 The right to performance within thirty days of a transaction.44 
 
S 43 contains a list of 18 items of information that must be “made available to 
consumers on the website” where products are offered for sale.  These are:- 
 
   “(a)  Its full name and legal status; 
(b)          its physical address and telephone number; 
(c)  its web site address and e-mail address; 
(d)  membership of any self-regulatory or accreditation bodies to 




Long-term assurers will have to provide the contact details of the Life Offices 
Association (the LOA).  They will also have to provide details of their accreditation with 
the Financial Services Board in terms of the FAIS Act, as well as the contact details of 
the FSB. 
 
“(e) any code of conduct to which that supplier subscribes and how that code of 
conduct may be accessed electronically by the consumer;” 
 
                                                
39 Sec 43(1) 
40 Sec 43(2) 
41 Sec 43(5) 
42 Sec 44 
43 Sec 45 
44 Sec 46 
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Reference must here be made to the various Codes of Conduct of the LOA and FAIS 
Codes of Conduct.  The LOA’s website address, where the Codes can be viewed, will 
have to be stated. 
 
“(f)  in the case of a legal person, its registration number, the names of its 
office   bearers and its place of registration; 
(g)  the physical address where that supplier will receive legal service of 
documents; 
(h)  a sufficient description of the main characteristics of the goods or 
services offered by that supplier to enable a consumer to make an 
informed decision on the proposed electronic transaction; 
(i) the full price of the goods or services, including transport costs, taxes 
and any other fees or costs;” 
 
 
It was already pointed out above45 that the FAIS Act requires full disclosure of 
detailed information about the product sold to a client. In the course of a normal (non-
online) transaction, such information and disclosures are provided to the client in the 
form of the contents of marketing material, the application-form completed and signed by 
the client, the written quote provided to the client as well as the contract issued and 
delivered to the client.  The General Code published in terms of the FAIS Act also 
requires that the information be “provided timeously so as to afford the client reasonably 
sufficient time to make an informed decision about the proposed transaction”.  Reference 
was made above to the various ways that the required disclosures can be made on a Long-
term assurer’s website. 
 
The comments under (h) above are equally applicable to this requirement. 
 
“(j) the manner of payment;” 
 
In the case of a Long-term insurance policy, “payment” will be in the form of 
premiums.  It will always be important to stipulate the exact date upon which the first 
premium is to be paid.  Often the cover in terms of a policy will not start until payment of 
                                                
45 Page 22 
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the first premium, or within a stipulated period eg. 30 days, prior to receipt of the first 
premium.  Because of the possible dispute that can arise as to the meanings of “payment” 
and “receipt” in the modern electronic banking world, clear stipulations in this regard will 
be to the benefit of both the client and the assurer. 
 
Reference can also be made here to the provisions contained in ss 43(5) and (6) that 
compels the seller to implement technology (a “payment system”) that will ensure safe 
and efficient electronic payments.    The seller can be held liable, in terms of the Act, for 
any damage suffered by the consumer that occurred as a result of the seller’s failure to 
comply with the Act in this regard.   
 
“(k) any terms of agreement, including any guarantees, that will apply to the 
transaction and how those terms may be accessed, stored and reproduced 
electronically by consumers;” 
 
A distinction must be made between the terms and conditions “normally” applicable 
to a certain long-term insurance contract (or the so-called “generic” terms) and the terms 
specifically applicable to each individual’s contract. Each individual contract will be 
different in respect of the type of benefit it provides, the premium payable, the term of the 
contract and health exclusions and guarantees that might be applicable. The normal or 
“generic” terms applicable “in general” to a specific product or type of product can 
therefore be made available for perusal on the website of the assurer, but it will always be 
necessary to provide each individual client with the exact terms of his or her policy 
contract. It is submitted that there exists no reason why, instead of providing the client 
with a paper-based copy of the policy agreement, an electronic version thereof cannot be 
e-mailed to him or her.   
 
“(l) the time within which the goods will be dispatched or delivered or with in which 




(m) the manner and period within which consumers can access and maintain a full 
record of the transaction;” 
 
 
As stated above, each individual client will have to be provided with a copy of his or 
her policy contract. There is no reason why this cannot be done electronically. 
 
“(n) the return, exchange and refund policy of that supplier; 
 
(o) any alternative dispute resolution code to which that supplier subscribes and 
how the wording of that code may be accessed electronically by the consumer;” 
 
 
Within the financial services industry alone, there are currently five different quasi-
judicial statutory and voluntary adjudicative tribunals: 
 
 
 The Ombud for banking services, a voluntary scheme;  
 The short term insurance Ombud, a voluntary scheme; 
 The long term insurance Ombud, a voluntary scheme;  
 The pension funds adjudicator, empowered by Chapter VA of the Pension Funds 
Act 24 of 1956; and  
 The Ombud for FSP’s, empowered by Chapter VI, part I of the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. 
 
“(p) the security procedures and privacy policy of that supplier in respect of 
payment, payment information and personal information;” 
 
The next Chapter will discuss the Data Protection and Privacy legislation soon to 
become law in South Africa.  Long-term assurers will have to study the requirements of 
such legislation closely to ensure that their security procedures and privacy policies are 




“(q) where appropriate, the minimum duration of the agreement in the case of 
agreements for the supply of products or services to be performed on an ongoing 
basis or recurringly; and” 
 
Comments under (k) above are equally applicable to this requirement. 
  
“(r) the rights of consumers in terms of s 44 where applicable.” 
 
 
The cooling-off provisions contained in s 44 are not applicable to electronic 
transactions involving financial services.  In terms of the requirements of the FAIS Act 
referred to above specific cooling-off periods will apply to transactions for long-term 
policies and must be disclosed to the client. 
 
Additional to the information that must be provided on the web-site, the consumer 
must also be provided with the opportunity:- 
 
 “(a) to review the entire electronic transaction; 
(b) to correct any mistakes; and 
(c) to withdraw from the transaction, before finally placing any order.”46 
 
Failure to comply with the provisions relating to the information that must be 
disclosed on the web-site or the opportunity to “review”, “correct” and “withdraw” will 
provide the consumer with the right to cancel the transaction “within fourteen days of 
receiving the goods and/or services”.  It is noted that the Act does not render the 
transaction automatically invalid due to such failure, but merely grants the consumer the 
right to withdraw from it.  It is therefore similar to a “cooling-off” provision.  It is 
submitted that the date of “receiving the goods or services” will be the date upon which 
the policyholder received the policy document, whether in paper or electronic form.  
Reference was made above to the cooling-off period of thirty days contained in Part IV of 
                                                
46 Sections 43(2)(a) – (c) 
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the Policyholder Protection Rules published in terms of the Long-term Insurance Act.47   
The Policyholder Protection Rules refer to “a period of thirty days of receipt of the 
summary contemplated in Section 48 of the (Long-term Insurance) Act”.   
 
A “cooling-off period” or right afforded to a consumer is, it is submitted, a right to 
review a purchase or transaction within a time period and then to cancel the purchase if  
so elected.  The consumer is granted this opportunity to reconsider a purchase normally 
where he or she might have been influenced to enter into the transaction as a result of 
compelling and enticing marketing material.  The consumer can fully review a 
transaction upon receipt of the product or terms of the transaction and should then, it is 
submitted, exercise the right of withdrawal within a specified period of receiving the 
product or terms.  It is therefore submitted that the words “within fourteen days of 
receiving the goods or services under the transaction” as it appears in s 43(3) were 
intended by the legislature to mean, in the case of a transaction for a long-term insurance 
policy to be the date upon which the consumer received the policy document.   
 
The policyholder enjoys in any event, in terms of the Policyholder Protection Rules, 
a cooling-off right that extends to thirty days of receiving the policy document or 
summary thereof.   
 
 
Protection of Personal Information 
 
Any transaction for the issuing of a long-term insurance policy, will by the nature of the 
transaction and product, involve the obtaining of confidential personal information of the 
consumer.  To enable the assurer to properly underwrite the applicant, i.e. assess the risk 
profile of the applicant and thereby determine an appropriate premium to be paid, 
personal information such as the following must be obtained from the applicant:- 
 
(a) Medical information, including current and historical facts; 
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(b) Professional and lifestyle (sporting or risky activities); 
(c) Income, smoking and drinking habits. 
 
Apart from the highly personal nature of the above information, an applicant will also 
be required to disclose information such as his or name, gender, race,48 address, marriage 
status, bank account details and insurance portfolio.49  Chapter VIII of the ECT Act deals 
with the protection of personal information.  The Act defines personal information inter 
alia as “ information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
national, ethnic or social original, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental 
health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of 
the individual” . 
 
The definition contains numerous other items of information about an individual as 
“personal information” and is clearly intended to give a broad definition of the term.  
This approach of giving a broad definition of personal information is also found in the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000, which was promulgated to 
provide individuals with a procedure by which to enforce their constitutional right of 
access to information against government bodies as well as private bodies holding 
records of such an individual.  Although the last mentioned Act was promulgated to 
provide the right of access, it also contains provisions that relate to the protection of 
personal information.  As stated, it contains a similarly wide definition of “personal 
information”.   
 
Chapter VIII of the Act endeavours to provide some protection to the privacy of 
personal information.  It must be pointed out, however, that it applies only to personal 
information that was disclosed during the course of (“through”) an electronic transaction.  
It is a relatively short Chapter containing a list of “principles for electronically collecting 
personal information”.  The principles reflect universally adopted data protection 
                                                
48 Financial Sector Charter, http://www.treasury.gov.za/press/other/2003101701.pdf  
49 In terms of the LOA Code on Good Practice for Disability Insurance, assurers must ensure that 
policyholders are not over-insured for purposes of disability benefits.  Information must therefore 
be obtained of other policies which provides similar benefits. 
55 
 
principles as already adopted and implemented in foreign jurisdictions such as the 
European Union.  Chapter VIII is not obligatory and it allows “data controllers” to 
voluntarily subscribe to the principles. 
 
The fact that the Act therefore gives relatively little attention to the important issue of 
data privacy can probably be ascribed to the fact that the South African Law Commission 
is currently drafting legislation that will specifically apply to the issues of data protection 
and privacy.  Although our constitution protects the right to privacy in s 14 thereof, no 
statute currently exists in South Africa that gives comprehensive protection and content 
to the right.  The ECT Act and the Promotion of Access to Information Act merely gives 
a measure of protection. 
 
During October 2005, the South African Law Reform Commission published 
Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) entitled “PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION”.  It 
included a Draft Bill and to “Promote the protection of personal information processed 
by public and private bodies; to provide for the establishment of an Information 
Protection Commission, and to provide for matters incidental thereto”.  Interested parties 
were invited to provide comment on the Discussion Paper on the Draft Bill by 28 
February 2006, which date was extended to 31 March 2006. 
 
In the introduction to the Discussion Paper the following is stated in reference to 
electronic transactions:- 
 
“Concern about information protection has increased worldwide since the 
1960’s as a result of the expansion of the use of electronic commerce and 
the electronic environment.  The growth of centralised government and the 
rise of massive credit and insurance industries that manage vast 
computerised data bases have turned the modest records of an insular 






“the question is no longer whether information can be obtained, but 
rather whether it should be obtained and, where it has been obtained, how 
it should be used.  A fundamental assumption underlying the answer to 
these questions is that if the collection of personal information is allowed 
by law, the fairness, integrity and effectiveness of such collection and use 
should also be protected”.  
 
 
The Paper refers to the fact that legislation already exits in foreign jurisdictions 
dealing with the protection of personal information and it refers specifically to “two 
crucial international instruments” being:- 
 
(a) the Council of the Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the automatic processing of personal data (CoE Convention); 
and 
(b) the 1981 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Developments 
(OECD) Guidelines governing the protection of privacy and trans border data 
flows of personal data.50 
 
The Commission points out that these agreements had a big influence on legislation 
around the world dealing with data protection and privacy as they contain technologically 
neutral principles relating to the collection, retention and use of personal information. 
 
It is necessary for purposes of this Paper to consider the Draft Provisions contained in 
the Bill as it will have an important and direct impact on all electronic transactions once it 
becomes law.  The Bill essentially aims to protect the privacy of personal information by 
prohibiting the processing thereof in any manner that is not consistent with the conditions 
and principles set out in the Bill.  Failure to comply with the Rules and Obligations 
contained in the Bill could result in the laying of a complaint to the Information 
Protection Commission to be instituted in terms of the Bill, or civil action. 
 
                                                
50 www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/ (accessed 01/04/06) 
57 
 
As in the case of the Promotion of Access to Information and ECT Acts, a broad 
definition is given to the term “personal information”.  The definition is in fact almost 
similar to the definitions contained in the said legislation.   
 
Chapter III of Bill contains the all important “Conditions for the lawful processing of 
personal information”.  It contains in Part A of the Chapter a series of eight “Information 
Protection Principles” that must be adhered to during the processing of personal 
information.  “Processing” is defined in the Bill as:-  
 
“any operation or any set of operations concerning personal information, 
including in any case the collection, recording, organisation, storage, 
updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use, dissemination by 
means of transmission, distribution or making available in any form, 
merging, linking, as well as blocking, erasure or destruction of 
information”.   
 
 
There can be little doubt that any online transaction involving the sale of a long-term 
insurance policy will qualify in terms of this wide definition as the “processing” of 
personal information.  Each of the principles will now be discussed briefly. 
 
 
Principle 1:  Lawfulness of Processing:   In terms of this principle, personal 
information must be processed in accordance with the law and in a proper and careful 
manner so as not to intrude upon the privacy of an individual to an unreasonable extent.   
Personal information may only be obtained and processed for the purpose for which it 
was collected.  In the case of long-term insurance transactions, this could mean that 
personal information must not be used by the assurer for any other purpose than the 
proper underwriting and issuing of a policy contract to the insured.  The first principle 
does however allow for the processing of personal information where a data subject has 
given consent thereto.   This concession is read to mean that a data subject can give his or 
her consent for the extended use of personal information such as for purposes of 
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marketing new of further products to the person, if such specific consent has been 
obtained from the person.  
  
Reference can here be made to s 24 contained in Part B of Chapter III of the Bill 
which prohibits the processing of “special personal information” unless the data subject 
has given his or her explicit consent thereto.  The section refers “special personal 
information” as information concerning a person’s “religion or philosophy of life, race, 
political persuasion, health or sexual life, or personal information containing Trade 
Union Membership, criminal behaviour, or unlawful or objectional conduct connected 
with a ban imposed with regard to such conduct”.  The fact that reference is made also to 
information about the “health” of a person can make the section specifically applicable 
to the long-term insurance business. 
 
 The first principle also states that personal information must be collected directly 
from the data subject unless it is contained in a public record or unless the person 
consents to the collection of such data from a third party source. 
 
Principle 2:  Purpose Specification:   The terms of this principle personal information 
must be collected for “a specific, explicitly defined and legitimate purpose”.  The data 
subject must be made aware of the purpose of the collection of the information and 
possible recipients thereof.  The principle importantly also deals with the retention of 
records by stating that records of personal information must no be kept longer than is 
necessary for achieving the purpose for which it was collected, unless required in terms 
of other legislation.  Records must be destroyed as reasonably practicable after this date.  
Insurance companies will in future have to ensure that they have processes in place to 
identify such “defunct” records and for it to be destroyed. 
 
Principle 3:  The Limitation on Further Processing:  In terms of this principle 
personal information may not be further processed in a way that is not compatible with 
the purpose for which it was collected.  The following can be taken into account for 




“(a) The relationship between the purpose of the intended further processing and 
the purpose for which the information has been obtained; 
(b)  The nature of the information concerned; 
(c) The consequences of the intended further processing for the data subject; 
(d) The manner in which the information has been obtained; and 
(e) Any contractual rights and obligations existing between the parties." 
       
Principle 4:  Quality of information to be ensured:  In terms of this principle, steps 
must betaken to ensure that personal information collected for a specific person is 
complete, not misleading, up to date and accurate.  It is submitted that this requirement 
could mean that long-term assurers must from time to time require the policyholder to 
confirm that information on record pertaining to that person is still correct.  Processes 
will have to be put in place to allow for this requirement.   
 
Principle 5:  Openness:  In terms of this principle information may only be collected if it 
has notified the Commission in terms of the Act.  In terms of s 47 of the Bill, the 
processing of personal information must be “notified to the Commission before the 
processing is started”.  Certain categories of processing which “are unlikely to infringe 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of (a) data subject” may be exempted from 
notification in terms of s 49.   Creating the Office of the Information Protection 
Commission is intended to promote transparency, accountability and effective 
governance of those entities that obtain, process and store personal information.  The 
duties of the Commission are set out in the Bill51 and includes the promotion of public 
understanding and acceptance of information privacy and protection thereof, the 
monitoring of compliance, the provisions of the Bill, consultation with members of the 
public and other role players, the investigations of complaints about alleged violations of 
                                                
51 Sec 39(1) of the Bill 
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the principle, research and reporting and the issuing of Codes of Conduct dealing with the 
objectives of the Bill. 
 
Principle 6:  Security Safeguards:  In terms of this principle, entities collecting and 
processing personal information must implement procedures to secure the integrity of 
personal information which will safeguard it against “the risk of loss of, or damage to or 
destruction of personal information and against the unauthorised or unlawful access to 
or processing of (it)”.  Security compromises must be notified to the Commission. 
 
Principle 7:  Individual Participation:  The provisions contained under this principle 
are similar to the rights of access to information provided for in the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act.  It gives a data subject the right of access to personal information 
held by an entity relating to the subject.  It furthermore allows the subject to insist on the 
correction of personal information where required.  It is submitted that long-term assurers 
should provide a policyholder with online access to all information held by an assurer in 
respect of that person so that the accuracy thereof can be reviewed by the policyholder at 
any relevant time.   
 
Long-term assurers should bear in mind that they could be holding information about 
a person to which he or she should not be given unqualified access.   Reference must be 
made here to Sec. 61 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, that provides for the 
limiting of access to “ a record provided by a health practitioner … about the physical or 
mental health, or well-being”  of  an individual. Access to such records should not be 
granted freely if the grantor is of the opinion that the disclosure of the record to the 
relevant person “might cause serious harm to his or her physical or mental health, or 
well-being”.     Adequate provision must first be made for “such counselling or 
arrangements as are reasonably practicable before, during or after the disclosure of the 
record to limit, alleviate or avoid such harm to the relevant person”.  As applying for life 
insurance could mean the undergoing of  HIV-testing, life assurers could receive  
information about an applicant’s health that  should best be disclosed to him or her by a 
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health practitioner and in a manner that will not cause undue emotional or physical 
hardship.   
 
A similar caveat does not appear in the Bill and the legislator should give 
consideration to the inclusion thereof.  Life assurers should also ensure that unqualified 
access is not granted to all categories of information as the disclosure thereof to a person 
could be detrimental to such persons health or wellbeing in certain, albeit exceptional 
cases. 
 
Principle 8:  Accountability:  This principle places the duty on processors of personal 
data to ensure that it has implemented measures to give effect to the principles set out in 
the Bill.   
 
The Bill furthermore requires each entity which will process personal information to 
appoint an “Information Protection Officer”.  It will be this person’s duty to ensure that 
the entity processes information in compliance with the Bill and to deal with requests for 
access to personal information by data subjects.  The role of such Information Protection 
Officer will not be dissimilar to the Information Officer required in terms of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act.  The Information Protection Officer will also be 
tasked with liaising with the Information Protection Commission in relation to the 
investigations that the Commission must carry out in terms of Chapter VI of the Bill.   
One of the duties of the Commission will be to investigate any processing which will 
involve information relating to criminal or unlawful conduct of third parties, processing 
of information for purposes of credit reporting and processing of special personal 
information referred to above.  The Information Protection Officer will have to notify the 
Commission where any of the above is to occur whereupon the Commission may 
investigate the processing procedure.   
 
This reporting duty can be compared to the duties placed on a Money Laundering 
Officer in terms of the FICA Act.  In the case of the FICA Act, the object of the Act and 
therefore the reason for the reporting duty is the combating of criminal activity in the 
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form of money laundering.  In the case of the Protection of Personal Information Bill the 
object is different, being the eradication of practices which infringes on the constitutional 
right to privacy of individuals. 
 
These two Acts illustrate to an extent the conflict and tension that exists between the 
promotion and protection of individual privacy on the one hand, and the necessity for 
crime prevention authorities to gain access to information in the commercial arena in 
order to combat crime effectively.  The growing  body of business that is conducted 
through the electronic medium (through electronic transactions) and therefore the 
growing body of information about the people and money involved therein, makes it 
increasingly necessary for law enforcement agencies to have access to the records and 
perhaps even the communications generated thereby.    
 
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act 
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act, No. 70 of 2002, (the “RIC Act”) was 
promulgated to regulate the interception of “certain communications”.  Although this Act 
prohibits the interception of communications as a general rule, it contains various 
provisions which allows for the interception or monitoring of communications. Any 
business entity, including Long-term assurers, that intends conducting its business 
through the electronic medium will have to give careful consideration to the provisions of 
this Act.  Of particular concern is the requirement that “telecommunication service 
providers”, which by definition in the Act includes “internet service providers”, must 
“provide a telecommunication service which has the capability to be intercepted”.52  The 
definitions of “telecommunication service provider”, “telecommunication service” and 
“telecommunication system” are fairly broad and could arguably include the offering of 
products for sale through a website.  The definition of “internet service provider” 
                                                
52 Sec 30  
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strengthens this concern.  It defines the term as “any person who provides access to, or 
any other service related to, the Internet to another person, whether or not such access or 
service is provided under and in accordance with a telecommunication service licence 
issued to the first-mentioned person under Chapter V of the Telecommunications Act”.  
This could oblige an entity with such websites to ensure that it utilises technology and 
information systems that “has the capability to be intercepted”.   A further concern is the 
fact that a “decryption key holder” can in certain circumstances be forced to hand over 
the decryption key.  Admittedly an “interception direction” or a “decryption direction” 
which is akin to a search warrant must first be issued by a “designated judge”, but it 
could lead to abuse by law enforcement agencies and an erosion of individuals’ rights of 
privacy.  Search warrants are usually granted on an ex parte basis and the subject, whose 
privacy is about to be infringed does not have the opportunity to show that the invasion is 
not justified.  It is to be seen how judges (in chambers) and our courts will deal with these 
issues.  It is also to be seen whether this interference with the e-commerce processes will 

















LIABILITY:  NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS, AND 
CONTRACTUAL AND DELICTUAL LIABILITY 
 
 
It is clear that the long-term insurance industry is a highly regulated industry and long-
term assurers must therefore be constantly mindful of the risks that it could incur if it fails 
to comply with the various statutory requirements imposed on it.  The aim of this Chapter 
is to consider the implications of non-compliance with the various regulatory and 
statutory requirements which includes statutes such as the ECT Act, the RIC Act and 
Protection of Personal Information Bill that is expected to become law in the near future.  
This Chapter will also deal with the possible contractual and delictual liability that could 
flow from actions or omissions that may occur during electronic transactions for long-
term insurance products. 
 
 
Long-term Insurance Act, 52 of 1998 
 
Part VIII of the Long-term Insurance Act deals with offences and penalties.   In terms of  
s 67(a),  a long-term assurer which contravenes certain requirements contained in the Act 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R100000.00.  
These requirements relate inter alia to:- 
 
(a) …………..; 
(b) The publishing of any misleading communication, brochure or advertisement 
that relates to the business of a long-term assurer or where such publication is 
misleading or contrary to the public interest or contains an incorrect statement 
of fact where any such advertisement, brochure or communication fails to 
include the name of the long-term assurer underwriting a long-term policy, 
and where an offence is also committed. 
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(c) The application to a person’s business, without approval of the Registrar, of 
the name or description such as “insure”, “assure” or “underwrite” or any 
derivative thereof unless he or she is a long-term assurer. 
(d) The carrying on of the business of a long-term assurer without being 
authorised to do so. 
(e) The granting of a free choice to clients when a new policy or existing policy is 
to be made available for purposes of securing debt (s 44 of the Act). 
(f) The provision of any valuable consideration as an inducement to enter into, 
continue, vary or cancel a long-term policy, the provision to the client of a 
summary of the policy agreement (s 48 of the Act).  
(g) The requirements and limitations set out in the regulations pertaining to the 
provision of policy benefits, the surrender of policy benefits and the making 
of a loan upon security thereof (s 54 of the Act). 
(h) The limitations on benefits to be provided in the event of the death of an 
unborn or of certain minors (s 55 of the Act).   
(i) The rules relating to the protection of policyholders in terms of s 62 of the 
Act. 
 
A fine not exceeding R1m can be imposed in case of the carrying on of the business 
of a long-term assurer without being authorised to do so (s 15 of the Act). 
 
 
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
 
In terms of s 10 of the Act the authorisation of a financial services provider may be 
withdrawn by the Registrar where it has ”contravened or failed to comply with any 
provision of (the) Act in a material manner”.  In terms of s 17 authorised financial 
services providers must appoint compliance officers to monitor compliance with the Act.  
They must also submit reports to the Registrar in a manner prescribed by the Registrar 
and at such times as prescribed in terms of Chapter VI of the Act.  The Office of the 
Ombudsman for Financial Services Providers was created by Chapter VI.  The Ombud 
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has the power to award compensation where a client who lodged a complaint with the 
Ombud has suffered financial prejudice or damage.  It may also issue a direction to the 
authorised financial services provider guilty of causing prejudice or damage or take such 
steps in relation to the complaint as the Ombud deems appropriate and just. 
 
The Ombud may make any order which a court may make53.   Part II of Chapter VII 
provides the Registrar with the power to institute civil action against any person 
contravening any provisions of the Act and may also institute action in a court for 
damages flowing from any non-compliance54.  The Registrar may also declare certain 
business practices “undesirable”55  the authorised financial services provider concerned 
may thereafter not carry on the business practice concerned.   
 
A fine of an amount of not exceeding R1m or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years may be imposed upon any person who contravenes such order 
relating to an undesirable practice or:- 
 
(j) if it acts as financial services provider without authorisation (s 7); 
(ii)       fails to maintain records for the prescribed minimum period of 5 years (s 18). 
 
 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2 of 2000 
 
Chapter IV of the Act creates a long list of offences which includes inter alia, the failure 
to identify persons, the failure to keep records, the destruction or tampering with records 
and the failure to report electronic transfers (ss 46 to 66).    It is also an offence to fail to 
give effect to a “monitoring order” issued by a judge in terms of s 35 of the Act.  An 
order will be granted in terms of this section where there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person is transferring or has transferred the proceeds of unlawful activities 
or property which is connected to an offence.  In terms of s 68 of the Act a penalty of 
                                                
53 Sec 28 
54 Sec 33 
55 Sec 34 
67 
 
R10m or imprisonment of a period not exceeding 15 years may be imposed if a person is 
convicted of an offence mentioned in the Chapter.  The lesser fine of R1m or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years may be imposed in cases of 
contravention of ss 55, 61 and 62 which deals with a failure to send a report to the 
Financial Intelligence Centre, a failure to formulate and implement internal rules to 




Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
 
In terms of Chapter VII that deals with consumer protection, in the cases of any non-
compliance with the provisions of the Chapter may be referred to the Consumer Affairs 
Committee (s 49).  It was pointed out above that compliance with Chapter VIII that deals 
with the protection of personal information is voluntary and the Act therefore contains no 
offences or penalties in this respect.  Chapter XII of the Act deals with the appointment 
of so-called “cyber inspectors”.    At date hereof no such inspectors have been appointed 
and it is still to be seen whether any such inspector will be appointed in the foreseeable 
future.  In terms of s 81 of the Act these inspectors will have the power to monitor and 
inspect any web-site or activity on any information system in the public domain and to 
report any unlawful activity to the appropriate authority.  It is furthermore stated that any 
statutory body, including the South African Police Service, vested with powers of 
inspection or search any seizures in terms of any law may be assisted by the cyber 
inspectors during an investigation.  Chapter XIII of the Act declares it a criminal offence 
to obtain unauthorised access to, interception or interference with a data message.  It also 
deals with several other forms of so-called “cyber crime” including computer-related 
extortion, fraud, forgery, attempt and aiding and abating.    In terms of s 89 of the Act a 
person guilty of contravening several provisions contained in the Act is liable to a fine 





(i)  The  accreditation of authentication products and services; 
(ii) The accreditation by the Minister of Foreign Products and Services (s 40) 
or the requirements in terms of critical data basis administrators in terms 
of Chapter VIV of the Act; 
(iii) The hindering or obstructing of a cyber inspector (s 80); 
(iv) Unauthorised access to computer inception or interference of data in terms 
of s 86 of the Act. 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 
The Proposed Bill provides for the institution on civil action by the Commission (or in 
this case the data subject) against any party who has contravened or not complied with 
any provision in the Act.  In terms of this section a claim may be instituted for an amount 
to be determined by the court as compensation for patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
damages suffered by the data subject in consequences of a contravention.  The amount of 
damages is limited to an amount not exceeding three times the amount of any profits or 
gain which may have accrued to the person involved as a result of the act or omission.  
Chapter VI of the Bill deals with offences and penalties.  S 91 specifically deals with 
penal sanctions in case of an offence in terms of the Act.  In case of a contravention of s 
88 (obstructing of the work of the Commission) a fine (unstipulated) or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding ten years be imposed.  In any other case a fine (unstipulated) or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months may be imposed. 
 
 
Contractual and delictual liability 
  
Apart from the risks and liability that may be incurred as a result of non-compliance with 
legislation, long-term assurers offering the sale of their products through the electronic 
medium must bear in mind the normal principles of contractual and delictual liability that 
will apply to their business.   As they take part in commercial transactions numerous acts 
and omissions could give rise to claims for damages.  Websites could contain erroneous 
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information about products which could induce purchasers to enter into transactions that 
they would otherwise have desisted from.  Financial calculators made available on a 
website to illustrate future benefits could contain errors.  Information provided or 
elections made by the purchaser, such as the particulars of a bank account from which 
premiums will be paid or the nomination of a beneficiary on a long-term policy or the 
disclosure of material information, could be recorded or processed incorrectly.  Important 
contractual terms, such as the amount of death cover that the policyholder will enjoy in 
terms of the contract, could be stated incorrectly due to a systems error.  Personal 
information of a policyholder could inadvertently be disclosed to a third party, causing 
the policyholder embarrassment and emotional distress.   
 
In all such cases, policyholders could claim that they suffered damages as a result of 
the act or omission and could hold the insurance company liable for their loss.  It is 
therefore important to consider the principles that would apply when such claims for 
damages are instituted. 
 
A distinction must firstly be made between patrimonial loss and non-patrimonial 
loss.  Patrimonial loss can be defined as “the loss or reduction in value of a positive asset 
in someone’s patrimony or the creation or increase of a negative element of his 
patrimony (a patrimonial debt)”.56   Non-patrimonial loss refers to the injury to 
personality and can be defined as “the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, 
in the quality of the highly personal (personality) interests of an individual in satisfying 
his legally recognised needs, but which does not affect his patrimony”.57
 
In South African Law, actions for the recovery of patrimonial loss can be brought as 
actions based in contract (if a contractual relationship exists between the parties) or in 
delict.  Where the action is brought in delict it is based on the lex aquilia.  An action for 
non-patrimonial loss is brought by way of an actio iniuriarum58.   
 
                                                
56 Visser P J and Potgieter J M, Law of Damages,  Juta and Company Limited, 1993, Page 42 
57 Visser P J and Potgieter J M op cit page 85 
58 Boberg PQR, The Law of Delict, Juta and Company Ltd, 1984, Volume 1, page 18 
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There are various ways that long-term assurers conducting business as aforesaid 
could expose themselves to claims for damages.  As stated, transactions for long-term 
products are based in contract.  As can be expected, disputes can easily arise as to the 
terms applicable to a specific contract, the interpretation of the terms thereof, the 
obligations created thereby, or the validity of claims. 
 
A party claiming damages due to a breach of contract will be entitled to insist that 
that he be placed in the position that he would have been had the contract been properly 
performed.  This is referred to as “positive interesse” which can also be defined as the 
total interest which a contracting party has in the other party fulfilling his contractual 
obligations.59  The party claiming damages will furthermore have to prove a causal link 
between the breach of contract and the alleged damages. Our courts will also limit the 
extent of the damages to be recovered by requiring that the damages ‘flow naturally and 
generally from the kind of breach of contract in question” or that “in the special 
circumstances of the case existing at the conclusion of the contract, the damages were 
within the contemplation of the parties …. and that the contract was entered into on the 
basis of such knowledge”60   
 
 
In his book entitled Computer Law61, Colin Tapper points out that a distinction 
should be made between business and consumer transactions.  He states that, in the case 
of business transactions, the law is prepared to “stand back and to let the parties reach 
the agreement which they themselves consider best meets their needs”.  In the case of 
consumer transactions however, the law is more interventionist “because it recognises 
frequent inequality of knowledge, means, and acumen which prompts it to offer a 
minimum safety net of protection to the consumer”.  Although Tapper makes this 
statement with reference to English Law it might well be or become equally relevant to 
South African Law.  The growing emphasise that is placed in South Africa on consumer 
protection as seen in this paper will in all probability have an influence on the way our 
                                                
59 Visser P J and Potgieter J M op cit page 20 
60 Harms L T C, Amlers Precedents of Pleadings, Butterworths, 4th Edition, 1993, page 102 
61 Tapper C, Computer Law , Longman Group UK Ltd, 4th Edition, 1998, page 140  
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The second and very important basis upon which liability for damages can be 
incurred is delict.  This refers to the damages that a party can claim from another due to 
the wrongful act or omission of that party.  In our law such damages can be recovered by 
way of the actio lexis aquiliae which entitles a plaintiff to recover patrimonial loss 
(which can include a purely economic loss) which the plaintiff suffered as a result of a 
wrongful and negligent act of a defendant.62   The wrongfulness can be constituted either 
as the breach of a common-law right or the breach of a statutory duty or the breach of a 
duty of care.  As in the case of a claim for damages due to a breach of contract, a plaintiff 
must prove a causal link between the wrongful action and the damages suffered.  As in 
the case of contractual damages, the plaintiff must also convince the court that the alleged 
damages claimed are not too remote from the action or event that caused it or that it were 
not foreseeable.  Where the wrongfulness is based on a breach of a duty of care (i.e. 
negligence) the plaintiff must prove that a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the 
defendant would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct causing injury to 
the other person or that person’s property; that such diligens paterfamilias would have 
taken reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence and that the defendant had failed 
to take such steps.  This is generally accepted as the test for negligence in our law.63    
 
 
In the context of electronic transactions within the long-term insurance business, 
damages caused by a wrongful act or omission will normally give rise to financial or 
“pure economic loss”.  Pure economic loss usually does not involve and is therefore 
distinguished from loss caused by physical harm.  Our law traditionally afforded this kind 
of damage in the context of breach of contract, rather than in the law of delict.     
 
                                                
62 Visser P J and Potgieter J M op cit page 190 
63 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 
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Developments in our law have however opened the door to the awarding of 
compensation for pure economic loss also in regard to delictual liability.   
 
One such area is liability for negligent misstatements or misrepresentations.  
Following upon the important English case of Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 
(HL) our Appellate Division accepted in the case of Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank 
van Afrika Bpk, that negligent misstatement causing pure economic loss can, in principle, 
give rise to delictual liability.  In the case of Bayer South Africa  (Pty) Limited v Frost 
1991 (4) SA 559 (A) the Appellate Division also held that a negligent misrepresentation 
inducing a contract could similarly give rise to delictual liability.  The factors to be taken 
into account quantifying the damages to be awarded were stated to be the following:- 
 
(i) The policy limits of relying on the legal duty; 
(ii) The professional standing of the maker of the misstatement; 
(iii) The nature and interpretation of the misstatement;  
(iv) The bounds of the test of negligence; 
(v) Whether loss to the specific plaintiff was foreseen or foreseeable; 
(vi) Causation; and 
(vii) Curtailing the so-called “limitless liability” that could arise as a result of the 
awarding of damages.64 
 
The advantage of being able to claim in delict rather than in contract, is that it entitles 
the plaintiff to a broader range of damages, such as general damages for pain and 
suffering.  The fact that a plaintiff wishing to sue for pure economic loss arising from 
negligent breach of contract may elect to sue in delict was confirmed in the Appellate 
Division case of  Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros 1983 (1) SA 475 (A).  In that 
case our Appellate Division confirmed that a plaintiff could, apart from the contractual 
claim for damages also elect to sue in delict, provided that the independent requirements 
of delict are satisfied. 
                                                
64 Burchell J, The Odyssey of Pure Economic Loss, University of Cape Town Acta Juridica 2000, 




In assessing the liability to be visited upon negligent misstatements causing pure 
economic loss, various factors will be taken into account by our courts.  An important 
consideration in the approach to negligent misstatements is the duty of care to be 
expected of professional persons as compared to the relative ignorance of clients and 
consumers.  This is a factor that must be taken into account by long-term assurers when, 
during the course of transactions, financial advice is given to the client. 
 
Another potential area of liability that long-term assurers must consider is the 
invasion of clients’ rights of privacy.  Included in a person’s right to privacy is a person’s 
right to decide “when and under what conditions private facts (about the person) may be 
made public”.  The wide definition of “Personal Information” and the extent to which 
information regarding personal particulars of  a client is obtained by a long-term assurer 
for purposes of issuing insurance contracts was pointed out above.  Many of these 
particulars relate to what  McQuoid-Mason refers to in an article that appeared in Acta 
Juridica 2000 65 as a “person’s inner sanctum” as it relates to his or her family life, 
sexual preference and home environment.  To this can be added sources of income, 
financial profile, dependants (which can include illegitimate children for which a 
policyholder secretly wants to provide) and medical status. 
 
Traditionally our law recognised actions for the infringement of rights to privacy 
under the “actio iniuriandi”.  With the adoption of South Africa’s constitution in 1996 
protection for a general right of privacy was introduced into our law.  In particular, the 
right extends to the right of a person not to have:- 
 
(a) His or her person home searched; 
(b) His or her property searched; 
(c) His or her possession seized; or 
(d) The privacy of his or her communications interfered with. 
                                                
65McQuoid-Mason D, Invasion of Privacy: Common-Law v. Constitutional Delict – Does it make a 




McQuoid-Mason considers the extent to which the constitutional protection given to 
privacy might create a constitutional action for damages and therefore a “new delict” as 
opposed to the common-law action merely “subsuming” the constitutional action. 
 
The essential elements required for liability in terms of the common-law are the 
following:- 
 
(i) An invasion of privacy; 
(ii) Wrongfulness; and 
(iii) Fault in the form of intention or animus  iniuriandi. 
  
 
The invasion of privacy can be constituted by an intrusion into privacy or the 
publication of private facts.  Where private information about an individual is unlawfully 
published to third parties (without lawful justification) it could therefore give rise to an 
action for the invasion of privacy.  The “wrongfulness” of the infringement of privacy in 
terms of the common-law is generally considered in terms of the “boni mores” of a 
society.  It is an objective test in the sense that it will be measured against the ordinary or 
reasonable sensibilities of a society rather than “hyper-sensitivity”.  Where an invasion of 
privacy therefore occurred regarding information that should not cause mental distress to 
a person of reasonable sensibilities such infringement will not be actionable.66  Any court 
considering alleged invasions of privacy will also take into account some subjective 
factors relating to the circumstances of a particular case, such as the nature of the 
information and the personality and station in life of the plaintiff.  McQuoid-Mason 
points out that such “subjective-objective approach” will be similar to the approach 
adopted by the Constitutional Court when it held that “a person’s subjective expectation 
of privacy will only have been wrongfully violated if the court is satisfied that such 
expectation was objectively reasonable”67. 
                                                
66 McQuoid-Mason op cit page 232 




The impact of the Constitution on the development of our common-law must also not 
be underestimated, according to McQuoid-Mason, as it plays an important part in 
defining the boni mores of society.  In terms of the constitution an infringement on a 
person’s right to privacy is prima facie unlawful. 
 
A further important influence that the constitution could have on the common-law 
protection of the right to privacy is in respect of the requirement of fault, being animus  
iniuriandi.   Traditionally, the common-law required a subjective intention to injure a 
person with knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act.  McQuoid-Mason expresses the 
opinion that the constitutional protection granted to the right of privacy could be regarded 
as so fundamental and important in South Africa’s new democratic society that strict 
liability could be visited upon infringements thereof.68   
 
Some support for this proposition stated by McQuoid-Mason can be found in the 
Chapter in LAWSA dealing with fault liability.69  The writers point out that the norms 
and values enshrined in the constitution (as developed by the Constitutional Court) not 
only serve as “yardstick for determining whether old principles are still current, but also 
as a source and inspiration for developing new principles and rules”.  It states that the 
Bill of Rights can even be considered as “the fourth pillar upon which our law of delict 
rests come together with the lex aqilia, the actio  iniuriarum and the remedy for pain and 
suffering”.  In dealing with strict liability70 the writers of LAWSA however point out that 
various attempts that have on occasion been made to introduce new instances of strict 
liability have so far not been successful.  The liability of the mass media is cited as an 
example of an attempted introduction of strict liability that did not succeed.  The writers 
also refer to our court’s preference to extend liability rather by attenuated form of 
intention and reversal of onus of proof. 
 
                                                
68 McQuoid-Mason op cit page 234 
69 Law of South Africa, Second Edition, Volume 8(1), Delict, Liability in South African Law, Fault 
Liability, paragraph 23 
70 Ibid paragraph 28 
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The current reluctance of our courts to extend the protection of rights to privacy is 
somewhat surprising in light of a changing approach from a public point of view to the 
issue of privacy rights in the modern computerised and commercial world.  Tapper71 
refers to “five propositions” in this regard.  The first is the fact that we now live in a 
world where intrusions upon personal privacy are more common than ever before and 
increasing.  The second relates to the fact that such intrusions can in part be blamed on 
the development of modern technology with specific reference to the application of 
computers for purposes of data processing which allows easy and instant access to vast 
quantities of information.  The third is that although the information so stored is often 
inaccurate and unchecked, it is still regarded by its users as irrefutable evidence of 
whatever it represents.  Fourthly, a general fear exists that information so stored will be 
available to any person who seeks to access it, whether authorised or unauthorised.  
Tapper identifies three elements relating to this proposition being:- 
 
(i) the fear of unauthorised use by those to whom the information has been 
entrusted for some other purpose eg the compilation of a large personal 
dossier bringing together into one large file information about an individual; 
(ii) the passing-on of personal information to third parties eg where a service 
bureau mixes up the files of different customers or where statistical 
information is released in a form from which personal information relating to 
individuals may be deducted; and 
(iii) the fear that outsiders may break down the security of a computer system, 
either by suborning employees or by electronic invasion. 
 
The fifth proposition relates to the absence of effective legal remedies to protect an 
individual whose privacy is threatened.   This proposition and the criticism that it holds 
regarding current legal rules is, according to Tapper, based on a wrong assumption that 
developments in computer technology necessarily requires a corresponding development 
in legal rules.  He points out that “the criticism misconceives the nature of legal rules”72 
                                                
71 Tapper op cit page 318 
72 Ibid  page 322 
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and that judges should be more prepared to apply general principles to new situations.  
He interestingly also points out the absence of a general remedy in tort (delict) in the 
United Kingdom related to the protection of the right to privacy.  He refers to the 
Younger Committee which was tasked to enquire into the desirability of establishing such 
a general remedy, but who rejected the idea.   
 
Interestingly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal recently confirmed, according to an 
article written by Rosemary Tobin in the LexisNexis Torts Law Journal73, a tort (delict) 
of invasion of privacy where private facts are published in circumstances where the 
publicity is highly offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
 
In the article referred to above, McQuoid-Mason considers the extent to which the 
common-law of delict concerning personality rights should be incrementally developed in 
South Africa to accommodate constitutional protection of privacy or whether a new 
constitutional delict should emerge and if so, what it should look like.74  From the outset 
he points out that a breach of s 14 of the Constitution will be regarded as prima facie 
proof of an unlawful invasion of privacy.  It will shift the onus on the defendant to show 
that the breach was justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.  He also points out that 
fault will not be a requirement and that the courts would have a discretion in awarding 
remedies.  Unlike the common-law test for unlawful infringement of privacy, the test 
under the Constitution would be a “two-fold” enquiry comprising the following two 
questions:- 
 
(a) Has the conduct complained of infringed the right to privacy as 
protected under the constitution; and 
(b) Was the infringement justifiable in terms of the limitation clause. 
 
In considering whether the action amounted to an infringement of the constitutional 
right to privacy, the court will firstly consider whether there was a reasonable 
                                                
73 Tobin R, Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Clause: the tort of invasion of privacy in New Zealand,  
Torts Law Journal, May 2004 (2004 TLJ LEXIS 7). 
74 McQuoid-Mason op cit page 246 
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expectation of privacy.  As stated above the plaintiff will have to show that he or she had 
a subjective expectation of privacy which was objectively reasonable.  Although 
information therefore might pertain to the so-called “inner sanctum”  of a person, that 
person’s expectation of privacy must still be weighed up against “the conflicting rights of 
the community”. 
 
In assessing whether an invasion of privacy occurred, a distinction must be made 
between several categories.  Firstly there are the so-called personal autonomy privacy 
cases where protection is granted to individuals against intrusions and interferences with 
their private lives.  Examples of such cases are the individuals’ right to make personal 
decisions about this use such as their family relationships, home life and sexual 
orientation.  The second category is privacy rights protecting information.  These rights 
protect the gaining of access, publishing, disclosure or use of information about others 
without their consent.  McQuoid-Mason also refers75 to so-called “special categories of 
privacy rights protecting information” which includes unlawful searches of people’s 
persons or homes  and unlawful infringements of private communications. 
 
As stated above fault is not a requirement for an action based on the infringement on 
a constitutional right to privacy.  This is also referred to as “strict liability”.  The 
remedies available to a plaintiff are:- 
 
(a) constitutional damages; 
(b) interdicts; and 
(c) declarations of invalidity. 
 
In cases for damages, the first two remedies will be of relevance.  McQuoid-Mason 
points out that in awarding damages for delict resulting from breaches of constitutional 
fundamental rights our courts will in all probability be guided by the common-law and 
that it is unlikely that additional constitutional damages will be awarded unless it is 
regarded as “an appropriate remedy”.  The common-law principles relating to damages 
                                                
75 McQuoid-Mason op cit page 250 
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in such a case are damages for patrimonial loss (if applicable), pain and suffering, loss of 
amenities (if applicable) and contumelia. 
 
In the conclusion to his article McQuoid-Mason states as follows:- 
 
“The courts will have to decide whether they wish to regard the common law 
delictual action for invasion of privacy or the constitutional right to privacy as 
the main vehicle for protecting individuals from unwanted intrusions or 
disclosures.  For the present they seem content to develop the common-law by 
infusing it with the spirit of the constitution”76  and “the emergence of a new 
constitutional delict would mean that a defendant could not rely on the usual 
delictual defences rebutting unlawfulness but would have to show that his or her 
conduct was reasonable and justifiable in terms of the limitation clause in the 
Constitution.”77
  
Long-term assurers will be well advised to recognise the increasing protection that 
our courts give to litigants who prove that their rights to privacy have been violated.  By 
virtue of the personal nature of long-term insurance contracts, long-term insurers are 
entrusted with confidential personal information pertaining to each policyholder.  By 
inviting persons to enter into transactions for long-term policies online and by storing and 
communicating huge volumes of personal information electronically, insurers will always 
be at risk of violating the privacy rights of their clients, whether as a result of a technical 
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It cannot be denied that the fast growing and worldwide trend of doing business over the 
Internet will, before long, convince long-term assurers of the benefits of offering their 
products for sale online.  Already many people prefer the convenience and comfort of 
doing their banking online, as well as purchasing many products such as books, CD’s, 
photographic equipment or even groceries in this manner.  A purchaser can access a 
particular website from the comfort and safety of his or her own personal computer at 
home, or from a lap-top computer whilst waiting to board a flight at an airport, or even 
from a hand-held device, that provides internet access, whilst lying on the beach.  And he 
or she can do it at any time that suits, without having to make an appointment to see a 
sales agent or experiencing the inconvenience of visiting a bank or a shop. 
 
Security measures in online transactions and communications have also developed to 
the extent that purchasers need not fear unduly that their confidential information, such as 
banking details or personal information, would fall into the wrong hands and cause them 
embarrassment, harm or loss. 
 
In many respects long-term insurance products do not lend themselves ideally to be 
purchased online.  They are complex in nature due to the fact that they call for long-term 
financial commitments with long-term financial implications.  They require various 
elections to be made such as the type and extent of cover required or the term that the 
cover will be in force.  There is also the need to provide medical and other information to 
the assurer, upon which underwriting can be done.  Most purchasers might therefore 
prefer to receive some measure of financial advice before entering into a transaction for a 
long-term insurance product. 
 
It is also clear that the long-term insurance industry is heavily regulated, with a 
strong emphasis on disclosure.  A plethora of legislation and Codes each require a list of 
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disclosures to be made, to which must be added the disclosures in terms of the ECT Act, 
in case of online transactions.  There are also the requirements relating to the 
identification and verification of purchasers and the reporting of suspicious transactions 
to law enforcement agencies.  At the same time long-term assurers will be bound to 
increasing demands to respect the privacy of purchasers and to ensure that they have 
adequate measures in place to protect data collected from purchasers.  Long-term assurers 
could also face new grounds of action in claims for damages, should errors occur in the 
processing of electronic transactions or if personal information is divulged to 
unauthorised third parties. 
 
The electronic medium of communication and digital information technology, 
however, brings with it solutions to many of the challenges mentioned above.  Through 
expert website design long-term assurers can ensure that detailed product information is 
brought to the attention of a prospective purchaser in a manner that is both informative 
and easy to understand.  “Click-wrap” and “web-wrap” methods can be used to ensure 
that purchasers are made aware of important disclosures and terms, before continuing 
with a transaction.  Purchasers can be offered the opportunity to review a transaction and 
to terminate it if they so wish.   
 
Financial calculators could assist in illustrating expected returns on investments or 
the premiums to be paid for the amount of cover required.  Websites could be 
programmed to pose all the pertinent questions and prompts needed to establish financial 
needs.  Glossaries could explain the meaning of technical terms.  In an interview with a 
personal financial adviser, the same purchaser might feel too embarrassed to admit that 
he or she does not understand certain terminology or that he or she wishes to reconsider 
or even terminate a transaction.  In transacting on a website no such personal discomfort 
need not occur.  A purchaser need also not be concerned about the commission payable to 
an intermediary or that the advice received from such intermediary might be influenced 




Websites could also be designed to allow policyholders to access their portfolios and 
personal records from time to time to update personal particulars or to request additional 
information or changes to their contracts.  Websites could also provide valuable 
information on claims procedures and allow policyholders to process such claims online. 
 
It is hoped that the legislator will desist from over-regulating all aspects of online 
transactions and, in particular, transactions for long-term insurance products.  The proper 
design of websites offering online transactions for long-term insurance products will 
assist in showing the benefits of transacting in this manner and to satisfy the legislator 
that more stringent regulation is not required.  This will hopefully stimulate the growth in 
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